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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

May 8, 2012
Re:

Daniel S. Fuchs, dba, Aubrey's House ofAle v. Idaho State Police,
Alcohol Beverage Control, Case No. 38714-2011

RESPONDENT'S ADDITIONAL CITATIONS
Relating to the issue of the application of 2012 Idaho Senate Bill l 33 2:
l. House Bill 421 before the Sixtieth Legislature, Second Regular Session, State ofldaho, 2010.

2.

IDAHO CODE

§ 73- l O1.

3.Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012).
4. Hill v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 150 Idaho 619, 628-629, 249 P.3d 812,
821-822 (2011).
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HOUSE BILL 421
Full Bill Information
Individual Links:
Bill Text
Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note

H0421 ..................................... bY JUDICIARY, RULES, AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Amends existing law to clarify when attorney's fees, witness
fees and expenses may be awarded in certain instances.
01/26
O1/27
02/04
02/05
02/08

House intro - 1st rdg - to printing
Rpt prt - to Jud
Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg
3rd rdg - PASSED - 69-1-0
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barrett, Bayer, Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Black,
Block, Boe, Bolz, Boyle, Burgoyne, Chadderdon, Chavez, Chew, Clark,
Collins, Crane, Cronin, Durst, Eskridge, Gibbs, Hagedorn, Hart,
Hartgen, Harwood, Henderson, Higgins, Jaquet, Jarvis, Killen, King,
Kren, Labrador, Lake, Loertscher, Luker, Marriott, Mathews,
McGeachin, Moyle, Nielsen, Nonini, Palmer, Pasley-Stuart, Patrick,
Pence, Raybould, Ringo, Roberts, Ruchti, Rusche, Sayler, Schaefer,
Shepherd(02), Shepherd(08), Shirley, Simpson, Smith(30), Smith(24),
Stevenson, Takasugi, Thayn, Thompson, Trail, Wills, Wood(27),
Mr. Speaker
NAYS -- Wood(35)
Absent and excused -- None
Floor Sponsor - Burgoyne
Title a pvd - to Senate
02/09 Senate intro - 1st rdg - to Jud
02/16 Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg
02/17 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg
02/24 3rd rdg - PASSED - 35-0-0
AYES -- Andreason, Bair, Bilyeu, Bock, Brackett, Broadsword,
Cameron, Coiner, Corder, Darrington, Davis, Fulcher, Geddes, Goedde,
Hammond, Heinrich, Hill, Jorgenson, Kelly, Keough, LeFavour, Lodge,
Malepeai, McGee, McKague, McKenzie, Mortimer, Pearce, Schroeder,
Siddoway, Smyser, Stegner, Stennett(Stennett), Werk, Winder
NAYS -- None
Absent and excused -- None
Floor Sponsor - Bock
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Title apvd - to House
To enrol
Rpt enrol - Sp signed
Pres signed
To Governor
Governor signed
Session Law Chapter 29
Effective: 05/31/09 for all cases pending and filed as of
06/01/09
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Sixtieth Legislature
Second Regular Session - 2010
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE BILL NO. 421
BY JUDICIARY, RULES, AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE
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AN ACT
RELATING TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; AMENDING SECTION 12-117, IDAHO
CODE, TO CLARIFY WHEN ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND EXPENSES MAY BE
AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES AND TO INCLUDE A DEFINITION; DECLARING AN
EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.

6

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

7

SECTION 1. That Section 12-117, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
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12-117.
ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND EXPENSES AWARDED IN CERTAIN
INSTANCES. ( 1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative
proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state
agency, a city, a county or other taning district or political subdivision
and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the
case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if the court it finds that the
nonprevailing party against whoffi the judgffleHt is rendered acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
( 2)
If tfle 13:eevailing party is awarded a partial j udgfflent and tl,e court

finds the party against whoffl partial judgfflent is rendered acted witl,out a
reasonable basis in fact or law, the court ol,all allow tl,e prevailing party's
attorney's fees, witness fees and ex13enoes in an afflount wl,ich reflects
tl,e person's partial :eecovery a party to an administrative proceeding or
to a civil judicial proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the
state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the case may be,
finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall award the
partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which
it prevailed.
(3)
Expenses awarded against a state agency, city, county or other
taxing district or political subdivision pursuant to this section shall
be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state agency,
tl,e city, the county or tl,e taHing district or political subdivision. If
sufficient funds are not available in the budget of the state agency, the
expenses shall be considered a claim governed by the provisions of section
67-2018, Idaho Code. If sufficient funds are not available in the budget
of the city, county OE taHing district political subdivision, the expenses
shall be considered a claim pursuant to chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code. Every
state agency, city, county or taMing district political subdivision against
which litigation expenses have been awarded under this act shall, at the time
of submission of its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental
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body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of expenses awarded and
paid under this act during the fiscal year is stated.
( 4)
For the purposes of this section:
(a)
"Person" shall mean any individual, partnership, corporation,
association or any other private organization;
(b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county or any taxing
district.
l£l. "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in section 67-5201,
Idaho Code.
(5) If the amount pleaded in an action by a person is two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500) or less, the person must satisfy the requirements
of section 12-120, Idaho Code, as well as the requirements of this section
before he or she may recover attorney's fees, witness fees or expenses
pursuant to this section.
SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its
passage and approval, and retroactively to May 31, 2009 and shall apply to
all cases filed and pending as of June 1, 2009.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS19257
Jn 1989, the Idaho Supreme Court construed Idaho Code Section 12-117 to permit awards of costs
and attorney fees to prevailing parties not only in court cases, but also in administrative cases.
Under the statute, such awards are only made if the non-prevailing party has pursued or defended
the case without a basis in fact or law. On June I, 2009, in the case of Ramm ell v. Department of
Agriculture, the Supreme Court reversed its 1989 decision and ruled that attorney fees could not
be awarded in administrative cases. This bill will restore the law as it has existed since 1989, and
it will become effective on May 31, 2009 so that those administrative cases which were pending
when the Rammell decision was issued will not be adversely affected by the Supreme Courts ruling.

FISCAL NOTE
There will be no change in fiscal impact on the General Fund.

Contact:
Name: Representative Grant Burgoyne
Office:
Phone: (208) 3 32- I 083

Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Note

H 421
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Statutes

Idaho Statutes
TITLE 73
GENERAL CODE PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
73-101. CODES NOT RETROACTIVE. No part
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.

of

these

History:
[(73-101) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 2; R.S., sec. 3; reen.
C.L. 500:3; c.s., sec. 9443; I.C.A., sec. 70-101.]

compiled

laws

is

R.C., sec. 3; reen.

The Idaho Code is the property of the state of Idaho and is made available on the Internet as a public
service. Any person who reproduces or distributes the Idaho Code for commercial purposes is in
violation of the provisions of Idaho law and shall be deemed to be an infringer of the state of Idaho's
copyright.

http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title73/T73CH1SECT73-101 PrinterFriendly.htm
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272 P.3d 1247
152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247
(Cite as: 152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247)

H

J. Jones, J., specially concurred and filed opin-

Supreme Court of Idaho,
Coeur d'Alene, September 201 I Term.
Lois M. BISHOP, personal representative of Patricia J. Shelton, deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent,

ion.

Hmton, J., dissented and filed opinion.

V.

R. Bruce OWENS and Jane Doe Owens, husband
and wife, and the marital community composed
thereof; Owens & Crandall, PLLC, a limited liability company operating in the State of Idaho; R.
Bruce Owens and Jeffrey J. Crandall, individually,
and in their capacities as principals, managers,
agents, partners, representatives, and employees of
Owens & Crandall, PLLC, Defendants-Appellants.
Owens & Crandall, PLLC, Third-Party Plaintiff,
V.

Idaho State Insurance Fund, Third-Party Defendant.
No. 37992.
Jan. 12, 2012.
Rehearing Denied March 13, 2012.

Background: Client brought action against attorney alleging breach of contract and legal malpractice based on alleged breach of attorney-client relationship and contingency fee agreement. After client passed away during pendency of action, the
District Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai
County, 2010 WL 3393364,John P. Luster, J., held
that legal malpractice claim did not abate upon client's death and that client's breach of contract action stated a claim. Attorney appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, W. Jones, J., held
that:
(I) legal malpractice claim sounded in tort, rather
than contract, and
(2) client failed to state a breach of contract claim
for which relief could be granted.
Reversed.

West Headnotes

111 Appeal and Error 30 iC=358
30 Appeal and Error
30VII Transfer of Cause
30VII(B) Petition or Prayer, Allowance, and
Certificate or Affidavit
30k358 k. Necessity of allowance or
leave. Most Cited Cases
Generally, an appeal by permission will be permitted when the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the orderly resolution
of the litigation. Appellate Rule 12.

[2] Appeal and Error 30 iC=842(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVl(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, m
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The Supreme Court exercises free review over
controlling questions of law.

13] Abatement and Revival 2 iC=52
2 Abatement and Revival
2V Death of Party and Revival of Action
2V(A) Abatement or Survival of Action
2k5 l Causes of Action Which Survive
2k52 k. In general. Most Cited Cases

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Abatement and Revival 2 €;::::::>53

17] Attorney and Client 45 €;::::::>129(1)

2 Abatement and Revival
2V Death of Party and Revival of Action
2V(A) Abatement or Survival of Action
2k5 l Causes of Action Which Survive
2k53 k. Actions on contract. Most
Cited Cases
Under the common law, claims arising out of
contracts generally survive the death of the
claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate.

45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45kl29 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45kl29(1) k. In general; limitations. Most
Cited Cases
Breach of an attorney's duty to a client in negligence is a tort.

[8[ Attorney and Client 45 ~105.5
141 Attorney and Client 45 €;::::::>129(1)
45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45k 129(1) k. In general; limitations. Most
Cited Cases
Legal malpractice actions are an amalgam of
tort and contract theories.

151 Attorney and Client 45 €;::::::>105.5

45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 105.5 k. Elements of malpractice or negligence action in general. Most Cited Cases
The contract basis of legal malpractice actions
is the failure to perform obligations directly specified in the written contract.

19] Attorney and Client 45 ~129(1)

45 Attorney and Client
4511T Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45kl05.5 k. Elements of malpractice or negligence action in general. Most Cited Cases
The tort basis of legal malpractice actions
flows from the elements of legal malpractice: ( 1)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2)
the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3)
failure to perform the duty; and (4) the negligence
of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of
the damage to the client.

45 Attorney and Client
45ITI Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45kl29 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45k 129(1) k. In general; limitations. Most
Cited Cases
Under the abatement rule, breach of an attorney's duty to a client is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher
standard of care in the contract, he is held to the
standard of care expected of an attorney.

161 Attorney and Client 45 <S::::>106

[101 Attorney and Client 45 ~129(1)

45 Attorney and Client
45TII Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45kl06 k. Nature of attorney's duty. Most
Cited Cases
The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a
client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained.

45 Attorney and Client
45111 Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts
45 k 129(1) k. In general; limitations. Most
Cited Cases
Breach of an attorney's duty to comply with a
standard of care expected of an attorney is a tort.

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Page 3

[q] Abatement and Revival 2 C=52

45k129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful
Acts

2 Abatement and Revival
2V Death of Party and Revival of Action
2V(A) Abatement or Survival of Action
2k5 l Causes of Action Which Survive
2k52 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Client's legal malpractice action against attorney alleging that attorney breached attorney-client
relationship sounded in tort, rather than in contract,
and therefore claim abated upon client's death,
where the standard of care in the contract between
the attorney and client was essentially the same as
in any attorney-client relationship.

112] Attorney and Client 45 C=I06
45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k106 k. Nature of attorney's duty. Most
Cited Cases
The contours of the duties owed by an attorney
to his or her client are defined by the rules of professional conduct.

113) Attorney and Client 45 C=I07
45 Attorney and Client
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45kl07 k. Skill and care required. Most Cited
Cases
If an attorney and client want to provide for a
higher standard of care than provided for by the
rules of professional conduct, they may do so by
express language in the contract.

114] Attorney and Client 45 C=I07
45 Attorney and Client
45TIT Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client
45k 107 k. Skill and care required. Most Cited
Cases

Attorney and Client 45 C=l29(1)
45 Attorney and Client
45TII Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client

45kl29(1) k. In general; limitations. Most
Cited Cases
Allegations that attorney breached contingency
fee agreement, which were the same allegations
contained in client's legal malpractice claim, could
not support a breach of contract claim; legal malpractice claims sounded in tort, rather than contract,
and because the contingent fee agreement contained
no express language providing for a higher standard
of care, the duty owed by attorney was not defined
by the contingent fee agreement.

*1249 Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for
appellants. Michael G. Ramsden argued.
Elsaesser, Jarzabek, Elliott & McDonald, Chtd.,
Sandpoint, for respondent. Joseph Jarzabek argued.

W. JONES, Justice.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
Patricia Shelton ("Shelton") filed suit asserting
breach of contract and legal malpractice based on
an alleged breach of an attorney-client relationship
and contingency fee agreement. During the pendency of this action, Shelton passed away. Lois
Bishop ("Bishop") sought to assert Shelton's claims
as her personal representative. R. Bruce Owens,
Jeffrey Crandall, and Owens and Crandall, PLLC
(herein referred to collectively as "Owens") asserted that the legal malpractice claim abated upon
Shelton's death and that the breach of contract
claim did not state a claim. Owens now appeals the
district court's decision holding that Patricia
Shelton's claim for legal malpractice did not abate
upon her death and that Shelton's breach of contract
action stated a claim. Furthermore, Owens seeks review of the district court's decision granting Lois
Bishop's Motion to Substitute as Plaintiff. Because
Patricia Shelton's legal malpractice claim sounds in
tort and abated upon her death, and her breach of
contract claim fails to state a claim, the district
court erred in denying Owens's Motion for Summary Judgment and in granting Bishop's Motion to

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Substitute as Plaintiff.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 3, 1997, during the course of her
employment, Patricia Shelton was involved in an
automobile accident that left her a quadriplegic.
The Idaho State Insurance Fund provided her with
workers' compensation benefits, including medical
benefits. On September 21, 2006, Shelton was admitted to North Idaho Advanced Care Hospital
("Advanced Care") to wean her off of a ventilator
on which she was dependent. Advanced Care's
treatment of Shelton resulted in further injury.
Thereafter, Shelton retained attorney R. Bruce
Owens to represent her in a medical malpractice
claim against Advanced Care. Shelton entered into
an attorney-client relationship with Owens and
signed a contingent fee contract on December 25,
2007.
ln September of 2008, Owens represented
Shelton in mediation with Advanced Care, Idaho
State Insurance Fund, and Advanced Care's insurer.
Shelton's medical malpractice claim was settled on
February 6, 2009, in the amount of $1,150,000.
Shelton, as a requirement of the settlement, signed
the Full Release and Settlement Agreement releasing the hospital and the insurer from liability. After
deducting costs and Owens's contingency fee, Idaho
State Insurance Fund sought the remainder of the
settlement funds in the amount of $664,543.54, citing its subrogation claim under J.C. § 72-223.
Idaho State Insurance Fund's subrogation claim was
later settled in the amount of $270,000. Owens did
not represent Shelton during the settlement.
Patricia Shelton alleged that prior to her signing the Full Release and Settlement Agreement,
Owens failed to inform her of the consequences of
the settlement and release in regard to Idaho State
Insurance Fund's subrogation claim. As a result,
Shelton filed her legal malpractice and breach of
contract claims on May 6, 2009, contending that
Owens breached his duty to inform her of Idaho
State Insurance Fund's subrogation claim and that

Page 4

the medical malpractice settlement could term in ate
or reduce payment of compensation benefits paid
by the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Shelton further
contended that Owens breached his duty to seek a
partial lump sum settlement, approved by *1250 the
Idaho Industrial Commission, settling the subrogation interest in her claim.
During the pendency of this action, on or
around November 10, 2009, Shelton passed away.
Owens later filed and served the Second Motion for
Summary Judgment on May 6, 2010. Thereafter, on
May 10, 2010, Shelton's attorney Joseph Jarzabek
filed its Motion to Substitute as Plaintiff pursuant
to Rule 25(a)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to appoint Bishop as personal representative. The district court denied the Second Motion for Summary Judgment by Memorandum
Opinion and Order on July 21, 2010. Owens made
timely application to the district court to appeal by
permission under I.A.R. 12(b), which was denied.
On October 20, 2010, this Court granted Owens's
Motion for Appeal by Permission pursuant to I.A.R.
12(c). Owens timely filed the Notice of Appeal on
November 8, 2010.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred in determining
that Patricia Shelton's claim for legal malpractice
did not abate upon her death?
2. Whether the district court erred in determining
that Patricia Shelton's claim for breach of contract stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted?

3. Whether the district court erred in ruling that
Shelton's claim for legal malpractice was not
barred by the economic loss rule?
4. Whether the district court erred in granting the
Motion to Substitute as Plaintiff?

5. Whether Lois Bishop is entitled to attorney's
fees on appeal according to J.C. § 12-120(3) and
LC. § 12-121 in her capacity as personal repres-

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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entative of Patricia Shelton?
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2] On October 19, 2010, this Court granted
Owens's Motion for Appeal by Permission pursuant
to I.A.R. 12(c). "Generally, an appeal under I.A.R.
12 will be permitted when the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal may materially advance the
orderly resolution of the litigation." Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d
3 09, 311 ( 1990). As this appeal involves controlling
questions of law, this Court exercises free review
over those issues. lnfanger v. City of Salmon, 137
Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d I 100, I 102 (2002).
V. ANALYSIS
A. Shelton's Claim for Legal Malpractice Abated
upon Her Death
[3] The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern.
See J.C. § 73-1 I 6 ("The common law of England,
so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with,
the constitution or laws of the United States, in all
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is
the rule of decision in all courts of this state."); see
also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 215,
796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law,
claims arising out of contracts generally survive the
death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure
tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667.
674-79, 34 P.2d 957, 960-61 (I 934); Kloepfer v.
Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477, 477
(1919).

The Idaho Legislature addressed whether negligence claims abate in amending J.C. § 5-327(2) to
provide that negligence claims, including legal malpractice claims, do not abate on the death of the injured person. Because the Idaho Legislature failed
to provide express language of retroactivity, J.C. §
5-327(2) is inapplicable to the present action,
which arose prior to the statute's effective date.FNt
See J.C. § 73-101 (asserting that "[n]o part of these

compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared"); see also Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho
444, 448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996). Thus, this Court's
ruling is dependent on whether Patricia Shelton's
legal malpractice claim sounds in pure tort or arises
out of contract under the common law. *1251 See
J.C. § 73-116; Helgeson, 54 Idaho at 674-79, 34
P.2d at 960-61; Kloepfer, 32 Idaho at 417-18, 184
P. at477.
FNI. LC. § 5-327(2) was amended effective July I, 2010.
This Court previously held that legal malpractice actions sound in tort in the context of attorney's
fees claims under J.C. § 12-120(3). See Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P.2d 561 (1999); see also
Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633
(1991). In restricting attorney's fees claims to commercial transactions under J.C. § I 2-120(3), this
Court held "that an action for legal malpractice is a
tort action ... even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a
'commercial transaction .... ' " See Rice, 132 Idaho
at 901,980 P.2d at 565 (quoting Fuller, 119 Idaho
at 425, 807 P.2d at 643). Although Rice and Fuller
have since been overruled regarding their prohibition of J.C. § 12-120(3) attorney's fees claims in
the context of legal malpractice actions, this Court
recognized that they were not overruled on the
characterization of legal malpractice actions as
sounding in tort. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146
Idaho 656, 664---65, 201 P.3d 629, 637-38 (2009)
(holding that commercial transactions under §
12-120(3) are not limited to contract actions and
may include legal malpractice tort actions even in
the absence of an attorney-client contract); see also
Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 256 P.3d 730
(2011) (holding that legal malpractice actions
sound in tort, but J.C. § 12-120(3) only requires
that there be a commercial transaction, which may
be satisfied with the establishment of an attorney-client relationship).
[4][5][6][7][8][9][10] As this Court previously
recognized, "[l]egal malpractice actions are an am-

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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algam of tort and contract theories." See Johnson v.
Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654
( 1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice actions
flows from the elements of legal malpractice: "(a)
the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b)
the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c)
failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence
of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of
the damage to the client.. .. " Id. (quoting Sherry v.
Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336,
1338 (1981 )). "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for
which the attorney is retained." .Johnson, 103 Idaho
at 704, 652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425,
807 P.2d at 643 (holding that the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140
Idaho I 34, l 36, 90 P.3 d 884, 886 (2004); Johnson,
103 Idaho at 704, 706--07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55.
The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is
the failure to perform obligations directly specified
in the written contract. See Johnson, 103 Idaho at
704, 706--07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that
a breach of contract claim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to do in the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale).
Thus, under the abatement rule, breach of duty is an
action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides
for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is
held to the standard of care expected of an attorney.
Breach of that duty is a tort.
[11][12][13] As further elaborated by Justice
Jim Jones in his special concurrence, the contours
of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct. If an attorney and client want to provide
for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language in the contract. Here, the standard of
care in the contract is essentially the same as in any
attorney-client relationship. Because this claim
sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's

death.
Owens also asserts that the personal nature of
the attorney-client relationship suggests that legal
malpractice claims are not assignable and, therefore, abate under Macleod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64,
75, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926). This Court need not
specifically address this issue because Shelton's
legal malpractice claim abated.

B. Patricia Shelton's Breach of Contract Claim
Fails to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted
[14] Owens relies on Trimming v. Howard, 52
Idaho 412. 16 P.2d 661 (1932), and *1252 Hayward
v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d
816 (200 l ), in asserting that the district court erred
in holding that Patricia Shelton may bring her legal
malpractice and breach of contract claims in the
same cause of action. Bishop asserts that Hayward
is inapplicable because it relates to medical malpractice claims and was based on a statute that
strictly required all actions related to medical care
to be pursued in the context of the local standard of
care. See Hayward, 136 Idaho at 349-51, 33 P.3d at
823-25.
Trimming and Hayward were actions where the
plaintiffs tried to assert contract claims in medical
malpractice suits in order to avoid the statute of
limitations defense applicable to tort claims. Id.;
Trimming, 52 Idaho at 415-17, 16 P.2d at 662-63.
Specifically, this Court rejected such claims, asserting that they pertain to "the provision of or failure
to provide health care" under J.C. § 6--1012. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 349-50, 33 P.3d at 823-24
(quoting I.C. § 6-1012). This Court affirmed the
claims as malpractice tort actions, "regardless of
the label assigned to them." Id. at 350, 33 P.3d at
824. Thus, Owens contends that where legal malpractice actions based on breach of duty are asserted, not based on any obligations or undertakings
specifically provided in a contract, a claim in tort
remains the sole cause of action. See Trimming, 52
Idaho at 415-17, 16 P.2d at 662-63; Hayward, 136
Idaho at 349-50, 33 P.3d at 823-24.
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Although the medical malpractice cases on
which Owens relies are governed by a specific statute, the fact that a proponent labels his or her action
as sounding in contract as well as malpractice does
not make the underlying action contract. The
"theory" of relief sought is not different. A holding
to the contrary would create a per se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action. Legal
malpractice has traditionally been treated as the
proper claim where an attorney breaches his or her
duty, which arises from the attorney-client relationship.
As noted in the previous section, because the
contingent fee agreement in this matter contained
no express language providing for a higher standard
of care, the duty owed by Owens is not defined by
the contingent fee agreement. The language in the
contingent fee agreement that "[ a]ttomeys shal I
represent Client in said matter and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard
thereto" is not materially different from the standard applied in the legal malpractice claim. Thus,
this action is really a legal malpractice claim disguised as a contract claim. A person cannot change
a tort action into a contract action simply by labeling it as such. Hayward, 136 Idaho at 350, 33
P.3d at 824.
As previously discussed, professional malpractice actions traditionally have been characterized as
tort actions in the context of the statute of limitations. To hold that this claim is clearly a separate
contract cause of action would render the two year
statute of limitations applying to legal malpractice
actions moot. See Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho
582, 585-87, 51 P.3d 396, 399-401 (2002). It
would also call into question matters such as the
standard of care regarding legal malpractice actions, which is to comply with the local standard of
care by an attorney, as well as the application of the
economic loss rule to legal malpractice claims.
Therefore, this Court holds that Bishop's
breach of contract claim, which asserts the same
claim as the legal malpractice theory, which has

traditionally been treated as the proper claim, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. The Issue Whether Shelton's Claim for Legal
Malpractice Is Barred by the Economic Loss
Rule Does Not Need to be Addressed Because
Shelton's Claim for Legal Malpractice Abated
In the Notice of Appeal, Owens argues that the
district court erred in ruling that Shelton's claim for
legal malpractice is not barred by the economic loss
rule. This issue does not need to be addressed because Shelton's claim for legal malpractice abated
upon her death.
D. Th e Sub stitution o f Lois B is hop as Personal
Representative for Patricia Shelton Was Improper Because Shelton's Claim Extinguished as
per I.R.C.P. 25(a)(1)
The basis of Owens's contention that the district court erred in allowing the substitution *l 253
of Lois Bishop is that substitution of the parties under l.R.C.P. 25(a)(l) is only applicable "[i]f a party
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished .... "
Since the legal malpractice claim abated and the
contract claim failed to state an independent action,
the district court erred in allowing the substitution
of Bishop.
E. Bishop ls Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees Under J.C. § 12-120(3) and LC. § 12-121
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and Idaho Code
section 12-121 apply to prevailing parties in a civil
action. Bishop is not the prevailing party in this action. Therefore, this Court denies Bishop's attorney's fees claims under J.C. § 12-120(3) and 1.C. §
12-121.

VI. CONCLUSION
Patricia Shelton's legal malpractice claim
abated upon her death, and her breach of contract
claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Therefore, the Motion to Substitute as
Plaintiff was improperly granted under J.R.C.P.
25(a)(1 ). Bishop is not entitled to attorney's fees because she is not the prevailing party.
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The judgment of the district court is reversed.
Appellants did not request attorney fees. Costs are
awarded to the Appellants.
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice EISMANN
concur.
J. JONES, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the Court's opinion but write to
make some additional observations regarding the
matters at issue.

Page 8

the client, just as any other contractual obligation.
For instance, I.R.P.C. 1.5 spells out the general
requirements pertaining to fees charged by attorneys, but the rule does not spell out the specific
provisions that must be written into the fee agreement. I.R.P.C. 1.5 states the general contours of
what an attorney may do and what the attorney
must not do. Violation of I.R.P.C. 1.5 may give rise
to a tort action for malpractice. Violation of the
specific tenns of the agreement made between the
lawyer and the client, where there is no claim that
the provisions of I.R.P.C. 1.5 were violated, gives
rise to a contract action.

Characterizing a breach of duty action against
an attorney has never been easy because, by definition, an attorney-client relationship arises out of
some fonn of contract, but a lawyer's duty of care,
which by implication becomes a part of that contract, is not necessarily spelled out in the contract
tenns agreed upon by the parties. A lawyer's duty to
a client is established by professional obligations
developed by the Idaho State Bar and this Court.
The contours of an Idaho lawyer's duty of care are
generally spelled out in the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (l.R.P.C.). "An attorney's duty
arises out of the contract between the attorney and
his or her client." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho
134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004). The things an
attorney is obligated to do for a client depend on
the type of matter or proceeding that the attorney
undertakes for the client. The attorney is obligated
to observe the duty of care attendant to such matter
or proceeding. An attorney may not make a contract
with the client to limit compliance with his duty of
care, except as authorized by the I.R.P.C., such as
obtaining infonned consent to reveal confidential
client infonnation (l.R.P.C. l .6(a)) or obtaining infonned consent to represent clients with conflicting
interests (l.R.P.C. l .7(b)(4)).

In this case, the breach of contract claim is
couched in tenns of Owens having violated his contractual duty to Shelton. It is claimed that Owens
failed to adequately infonn Shelton about the operation of J.C. § 72-223, resulting in the fact that
Shelton might end up with nothing if the Idaho
State Insurance Fund exercised its full right of subrogation. Owens was required to adequately infonn
*l 254 Shelton in this regard but that duty arose under l.R.P.C. I .4, rather than the Contingent Fee
Contract (Contract) between the parties. In her
briefing, Bishop also contends that Owens specifically violated paragraph I of the Contract, providing
that, "[Owens' finn] shall represent [Shelton] in
said manner and do all things necessary, appropriate, or advisable, in regard thereto, whether the
same be by representation in legal proceedings or
otherwise." However, these are obligations that
Owens had under I.R.P.C. I. I and 1.3. Since the alleged breaches of duty for which Shelton sued
Owens are duties emanating from the I.R.P.C., the
action is tort in nature.

As the Court notes in its Opinion, a lawyer can
agree to do things or perfonn tasks above and beyond those provided for in, and not prohibited by,
the I.R.P.C. Such additional undertakings are not
required by the l.R.P.C. or the lawyer's general duty
of care and, therefore, are strictly contractual in
nature. Such undertakings should be enforceable in
a contract action and should survive the death of

Had Shelton sued Owens for violating the specific fee provisions of the Contract, whereby she
agreed to pay Owens "forty percent (40%) of the
gross recovery of any and all funds received in settlement or recovered after filing an action in any
Court," a contract action would have been appropriate. It appears from the record that Owens took a
fee of $460,000 off of the top of the $1,150,000 set-
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tlement with Advance Care, representing 40% of
the total settlement, along with reimbursing himself
for $25,456.46 in costs. That left a total of
$664,543.54, all of which (and much more) was
subject to the Insurance Fund's subrogated claim.
Other counsel negotiated a reduction of the subrogated claim down to $270,000, leaving a balance of
$394,543.54. There is no indication as to whether
such other counsel charged an additional fee for
such negotiation with the Insurance Fund, nor is
there any indication as to whether any portion of
the $460,000 fee obtained by Owens was taken into
account as the Insurance Fund's responsibility for
the Advance Care settlement under a common fund
theory. The record does not disclose how the balance was distributed. Shelton possibly could have
made the claim that Owens' fee should have been
calculated on some amount other than $1,150,000,
where he obviously knew that the subrogated claim
would greatly exceed any amount left after he obtained the full amount of his fee. However, the contract claim pursued by Shelton, and then Bishop,
did not involve this contractual question so no valid
contact claim was presented on appeal.
HORTON, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion that Shelton's claim abated upon her death. I
do so because I believe that her claim of breach of
contract stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and therefore, the cause of action did not
abate.
This Court has long recognized that the duties
owed in tort cases are those imposed by law, and do
not have their origins in the explicit terms of the
parties' contract_FN 2 Recently, in Weinstein v.
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho
299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), this Court addressed an
earlier decision in Inland Group of Companies, Inc.
v. Providence Washington lnrnrance Co., 133
Idaho 249, 985 P.2d 674 (1999). In Inland Group,
the Court upheld an award of punitive damages for
the tort of bad faith where the insurance company
had failed to timely pay the undisputed portion of a

claim. Id. at 259, 985 P.2d at 684. Although the insurance policy at issue contained an arbitration provision relating to disputed claims, this Court rejected the insurer's claim that it had no duty to pay under the policy until the insured complied with all
provisions of the policy including arbitration. Id. at
255-56, 985 P.2d at 680-8 I. Weinstein explained
the reasons for this decision as follows:
FN2. In this regard, I take issue with the
majority's reliance on Johnson v. Jones,
103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982), for
the proposition that "[t]he contract basis of
legal malpractice actions is the failure to
perform obligations directly specified in
the written contract." However, Johnson
cannot be said to hold that an attorney's
negligent breach of the express terms of a
written contract is only actionable in tort
because in Johnson there was no written
contract. Rather, the Court in Johnson
noted that it was "undisputed that [the attorney] never spoke with the [plaintiffs] or
affirmatively stated that he would represent them." Id. at 703, 652 P.2d at 651. Indeed, the Court noted that "the earnest
money agreement is admittedly vague as to
what the attorney's fees that the parties
were to 'share equally in' would purchase .... " Id. at 704 n. 2, 652 P.2d at 652 n.
2. The Court concluded that the attorney
"was retained solely to draw up a contract
of sale." Id.
In rejecting that argument we stated, "The duty
to act in good faith exists at all *1255 times during the settlement process. Furthermore, a claim

for breach of the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing is independent of a technical breach of
the obligation to pay. " [Inland Group, 133 Idaho]
at 255, 985 P.2d at 680. We added, "The tort recognized by this Court in White [v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d I 014
(I 986) ] is grounded upon the breach of this independent implied contractual duty of good faith. It
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cannot be properly regarded as a claim for tortious breach of the explicit terms of the contract
such as the duty to pay. " 133 Idaho at 255, 985
P.2d at 680.
149 Idaho at 322, 233 P.3d at 1244 (emphasis
added).
In Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145
Idaho 346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008), this Court explained the interplay between contract and tort actions in similar tenns:
In addition, "[i]n order for a cause of action to
arise in tort, Claimants must establish the breach
of a tort duty, separate and apart from any duty
allegedly created by the contract." Vickers [v.
Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 832, 835,
875 P.2d 929, 932 (I 994) ]. Furthennore,
"negligent conduct and breach of contract are two
distinct theories of recovery. Ordinarily, breach
of contract is not a tort, although a contract may
create the circumstances for the commission of a
tort." Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99
Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978). But,
"[t]he mere negligent breach or n onperformance
of a contract will not sustain an action sounding
in to rt, in the absence of a liability imposed by
law independent of that arising out of the contract itself " Steiner Corp. v. Am. Dist. Tel., 106
Idaho 787, 790, 683 P.2d 435, 438 (I 984)
(internal quotations omitted).
145 Idaho at 350, 179 P.3d at 313 (emphasis
added).
In Baccus, Justice Warren Jones continued,
emphasizing that tort duties arise by operation of
law, whereas contractual duties arise from the mutual assumption of rights and duties by the contracting parties:
ln Just's, this Court explained the difference
between the purposes of contract law and tort law
thusly:

contract lies in the nature of the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the
interest in freedom from various kinds of harm.
The duties of conduct which give rise to them
are imposed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon
the will or intention of the parties.... Contract
actions are created to protect the interest in
having promises perfonned. Contract obligations are imposed because of conduct of the
parties manifesting consent, and are owed only
to the specific individuals named in the con- tract.

Just's, 99 Idaho at 468, 583 P.2d at I 003 (quoting
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 92 at
613 (4th ed.1971)).
Id at 350-511, 179 P.3d at 313-14 (emphasis
added).
In Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d
1322 (I 990), this Court similarly emphasized that
the source of a duty in tort is not found within the
tenns of the parties' contract. The Court quoted its
earlier decision in Carroll v. United Steelworkers of
America, 107 Idaho 717, 719, 692 P.2d 361, 363
(1984), which held that "an alleged failure to perfonn a contractual obligation is not actionable in
tort .... 'To found an action in tort, there must be a
breach of duty apart from non-performance of a
contract.'" 118 Idaho at 478,797 P.2d at 1326
(internal citations omitted, emphasis original). Even
prior to Carroll, this Court repeatedly made similar
pronouncements. See Steiner Corp., I 06 Idaho at
790-91, 683 P.2d at 438-39 ("a clear duty must be
shown to exist by operation of law, separate and
apart from the contractual duty .... "); Taylor v.
Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669
(1971) ("Ordinarily, a breach of contract is not a
tort. A contract may, however, create a state of
things which furnishes the occasion for a tort.");
Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481,
486-87, 174 P. 1009, 1010 (1918) ("to detennine
the fonn in which redress must be sought, it is necessary to ascertain source or origin. If * 1256 it be

The fundamental difference between tort and
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found that right or duty was created independent of
the consent of the parties concerned, the action is in
tort; if because of such consent, it is on contract.").
In Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137,
90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004), this Court stated that "[a]n
attorney's duty arises out of the contract between
the attorney and his or her client." We have recently reiterated this language from Harrigfeld in
Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 326, 256 P.3d
730, 734 (2011). However, the holding in Harrig(eld was not based upon the express terms of the attorney-client contract; rather, the Court noted that
the existence of a duty was a question of law. 140
Idaho at 138, 90 P.3d at 888. In determining whether a duty would be imposed by operation of law, the
Court then conducted a balance-of-the-harms test. Id
I do not think that Hayward v. Valley Vista
Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001),
discussed by the majority, provides guidance for
resolution of the instant appeal. Although the Hayward Court addressed the holding in Trimming v.
Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932), its decision that plaintiff was precluded from bringing a
contract action against a health care provider was
based upon an application of I.C. § 6-1012. Id at
350, 33 P.3d at 824. In Trimming, th is Court did
make the following statement, which sounds much
like the holding of the majority in the present case:
"Respondent is not arraigned for breach of contract,
but for delinquencies incidental to its performance.
As alleged, these are the very foundation of the action, and, if true, constituted nothing but malpractice. The gist of a malpractice action is negligence,
not a breach of the contract of employment." 52
Idaho at 416, 16 P.2d at 662.
However, this statement followed a traditional
statement, along the lines previously discussed, distinguishing the sources of duties imposed in tort
and contract cases:
The complaint primarily alleges that a contract
for treatment was entered into between the

parties. So far so good. But, in the performance
of that contract, respondent impliedly contracted
that he would exercise ordinary and reasonable
care (48 CJ. 1115, par. IOI), the [sic] which is
another way of saying that such duty is imposed
by law. Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 55 P.
1000, I 002 [ (I 899) ], enunciating as follows:
The contract of employment has nothing
whatever to do with the liability, except to create a duty on the part of the employer,-a duty
not expressed in the contract, and for the violation of which the contract of employment furnishes no rule or standard for the estimation of
damages. Nor is the action grounded upon the
contract, but upon the duty springing from the
relation created by it, viz., that of employer and
employee, and under the old system of pleading
was always classed as an action ex delicto.

Id. at 415, 16 P.2d at 662 (emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing, I believe that the
body of law discussed both in the majority opinion
and in this dissent recognizes that the duties imposed by operation of law in malpractice actions
flow from the relationship created by the contractual relationship of the parties, not the contract itself.
In this case, Owens specifically undertook and
promised that "[a]ttorneys shall represent Client in
said matter and do all things necessary, appropriate,
or advisable, in regard thereto." There is no suggestion that Owens was incompetent or otherwise
lacked the capacity to contract. There is likewise no
suggestion that he was unaware of the nature of his
undertaking (after all, it was his firm's form contract), or that he did not voluntarily enter into the
agreement, or that there was no consideration for
his promise. In the absence of such circumstances
as might permit avoidance of the terms of an express contract, I am unaware of any prior instance
where this Court has determined that a party may
be relieved of liability for the breach of an express
term of a written contract on the basis that the
"wrong theory" was advanced by plaintiff.
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The majority expresses its concern that "[a]
holding to the contrary would create a per se breach
of contract action in every legal malpractice action." I would first note *1257 that this is a gross
overstatement. The position I espouse only applies
in instances involving express contractual undertakings. In this case, no one forced Owens to enter a
contract prescribing the manner in which he would
represent his client. Had he not elected to identify
the manner in which he would perform his services,
his duty to his client would have been imposed by
law, this action would sound in tort, and I would be
joining with the majority.

Idaho,2012.
Bishop v. Owens
152 Idaho 616,272 P.3d 1247
END OF DOCUMENT

I, too, have concern for the result of this appeal. There is the very real concern that the decision of this Court will reinforce the perception,
shared by many in our society, that courts will go
out of their way in order to protect members of the
bar,FNJ My position, which I believe to be wellgrounded in existing law, simply recognizes that
lawyers do not hold a special place in society that
insulates them from the type of liability that any
other party to a contract would face.
FN3. This perception may well evaporate
when trial courts begin to instruct juries in
legal malpractice cases that the attorney's
duty is to "do all things necessary, appropriate or advisable, in regard" to the subject of representation. Based upon the majority's statement that this is "not materially different from the standard applied in
the legal malpractice claim," it appears that
such an instruction would be appropriate.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision
of the district court and hold that Shelton stated a
claim for breach of contract upon which relief can
be granted. As the majority correctly notes, a claim
arising ex contractu survives the death of the
claimant. Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 418, 184
P. 477, 477 (1919). Accordingly, I dissent from the
Court's determination that the action abated and the
case should be remanded for dismissal.
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Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, May 2010 Tenn.
Marcie Rae HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, dba American Family Insurance, a
foreign insurance corporation licensed to do business in the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.

12] Appeal and Error 30 €;;::::>863

No. 36311.
Jan. 5, 2011.
Rehearing Denied April 29, 2011.

Background: Insured, who had been involved in
car accident with tortfeasor, filed suit against her
underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer, after insurer
denied her claim for UIM benefits, alleging breach
of contract and fraud. Parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The District Court, Bannock County, Stephen S. Dunn, J., granted summary judgment to insurer. Insured appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, W. Jones, J., held
that:
(1) exhaustion clause in UIM policy, requiring insured to deplete all of the tortfeasor's bodily injury
insurance before she could collect UIM benefits,
was void, but
(2) insured was not entitled to appellate attorney fees.
Vacated and remanded.

Eismann, C.J., dissented,
which Horton, J., concurred.
West Headnotes

with

opinion,

30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court applies the same standard
as the district court when reviewing a grant of a
motion for summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 56(c).

m

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
Fact that the parties have filed cross-motions
for summary judgment does not change the standard of review, and the court must evaluate each
party's motion on its own merits. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 56(c).

[3] Appeal and Error 30 €;;::::>934(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(G) Presumptions
30k934 Judgment
30k934(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Supreme Court, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, will liberally construe the record in
favor of the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and will draw all reasonable inferences
and conclusions in favor of that party. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).

II] Appeal and Error 30 €;;::::>863
[4] Appeal and Error 30 €;;::::>863
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review

30 Appeal and Error
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[7] Appeal and Error 30 €==842(8)

30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on
Nature of Decision Appealed from
30k863 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
On Supreme Court's review of a grant of summary judgment, the entire record is freely reviewed
to detennine if either side was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law and to detennine
whether inferences drawn by the district court are
reasonably supported by the record. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c).

30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, m
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or of Fact
30k842(8) k. Review where evidence consists of documents. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court freely reviews the question of
whether an insurance contract is ambiguous.

[5] Contracts 95 €:=143(1)

[8] Insurance 217 €==2787

95 Contracts
95IJ Construction and Operation
95JI(A) General Rules of Construction
95kl43 Application to Contracts in General
95kl43(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases

217 Insurance
2 l 7XXII Coverage-Automobile Insurance
2 l 7XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage
2 I 7k2785 Uninsured Motorists or Vehicles
2 l 7k2787 k. Underinsurance; exhausted coverage. Most Cited Cases
Exhaustion clause in insured's underinsured
motorist (UIM) policy, requiring her to deplete all
of the tortfeasor's bodily injury insurance before
she could collect underinsurance benefits, explicitly
created a condition precedent to UIM benefits, such
that insured was entitled to coverage only if she
settled or received payment for the tortfeasor's
policy limits.

Contracts 95 €==152
95 Contracts
95II Construction and Operation
95II(A) General Rules of Construction
95k 151 Language of Instrument
95k!52 k. In general. Most Cited Cases
A contract must be interpreted according to the
plain meaning of the words used if the language is
clear and unambiguous.

[6] Insurance 217 €==1808
217 Insurance
2 l 7XIII Contracts and Policies
2 l 7XIII(G) Rules of Construction
2 I 7k I 808 k. Ambiguity in general. Most
Cited Cases
An insurance policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.

[9] Insurance 217 C=l 728
217 Insurance
2 l 7XJII Contracts and Policies
2 l 7XIII(A) In General
217k 1728 k. Questions of law or fact.
Most Cited Cases
Whether a provision of an insurance policy violates public policy is a question of law.

[10] Contracts 95 €==108(1)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
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95T(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k!08 Public Policy in General
95kl08(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The liberty of contract is not an absolute and
unlimited right, but upon the contrary is always
subservient to the public welfare.

I 11] Contracts 95 <C= 108(1)
9 5 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95 l(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95kl08 Public Policy in General
95k I 08(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The usual test applied by courts in determining
whether a contract offends public policy and is antagonistic to the public interest is whether the contract has a tendency toward such an evil.

[12] Contracts 95 €:=108(1)
9 5 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95l(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95kl08 Public Policy in General
95kl08(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
For purposes of determining whether contract
violates public policy, public policy may be found
and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions or the
Constitution.

[13] Insurance 217 €:=1725
217 Insurance
2 l 7XIII Contracts and Policies
2 l 7XIII(A) In General
217kl 720 Validity and Enforceability
217kl725 k. Public policy. Most Cited
Cases
Whether an insurance contract is against public

Page 3

policy is to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of each case; in addition, analogous
cases involving the same general principles may be
looked to by the court in arriving at a satisfactory
conclusion.

1141 Insurance 217 €:=2787
217 Insurance
2 l 7XXII Coverage-Automobile Insurance
2 l 7XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage
2 l 7k2785 Uninsured Motorists or Vehicles
217k2787
k. Underinsurance; exhausted coverage. Most Cited Cases
Exhaustion clause in underinsured motorist
(UIM) automobile insurance policy, requiring insured to deplete all of the tortfeasor's bodily injury
insurance before she could collect VIM benefits,
was void, as it was against state's declared public
policy aimed at protecting its citizens from underinsured drivers and it contravened doctrine of judicial economy, which included shielding parties
from excessive litigation and preventing unnecessary demands on the judicial system, and, thus, insured, who was involved in car accident with tortfeasor, and who settled with tortfeasor for less than
her automobile insurer's policy limit for bodily insurance coverage, was not required to exhaust limits of tortfeasor's policy, but instead, was required
to credit to her UIM insurer the gap between settlement she entered into with tortfeasor and the policy
limits. West's LC.A.§ 41-2502(1).

[ 15] Insurance 217 €:= 1727
217 Insurance
2 l 7XIII Contracts and Policies
2 l 7XIII(A) In General
217k l 727 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases

Insurance 217 <C= 1777
217 Insurance
2 l 7XI11 Contracts and Policies
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2 I 7XIII(C) Formal Requisites
217k 1777 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Absent an assertion to the contrary, the Supreme Court presumes that an insurance policy was
submitted to the Director of Insurance and was
found to comport with public policy.

116] Insurance 217 ~1727
2 17 Insurance
2 l 7XIII Contracts and Policies
2 l 7XIII(A) In General
217k 1727 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases

Insurance 217 ~1777
217 Insurance
217XIII Contracts and Policies
217XIII(C) Formal Requisites
2 l 7kl 777 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases
The fact that the Director of Insurance may
have approved an insurance contract's terms merely
creates a presumption that the terms are valid and is
not conclusive.

Page4

strued to

effect to the intent of the legislature.

[19] Insurance 217 ~2787
217 Insurance
2 l 7XXII Coverage-Automobile Insurance
217XXII(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage
2 l 7k2785 Uninsured Motorists or Vehicles
217k2787 k. Underinsurance; exhausted coverage. Most Cited Cases
An exhaustion clause in an underinsured motorist (VIM) automobile insurance policy, requiring
the insured to deplete all of the tortfeasor's bodily
injury insurance before he may collect VIM benefits from his VIM insurer, is void, unenforceable,
and severable; to collect against his insurer, a VIM
insured may proceed against the VIM carrier, who
must investigate and attempt to resolve the claim in
good faith regardless of whether the insured settled
with the tortfeasor's insurer or, if so, for how much,
and the VIM carrier will receive credit for the full
amount of the tortfeasor's policy, regardless of the
insured's actual recovery. West's LC.A. §
41-2502(1).

[17] Insurance 217 ~2806
[20] Insurance 217 ~1725
217 Insurance
2 I 7XXII Coverage-Automobile Insurance
2 l 7XXJI(D) Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage
2 l 7k2804 Credits, Deductions, and Offsets
2 l 7k2806 k. Recovery under other insurance. Most Cited Cases
An underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer is always is allowed to credit full amount of tortfeasor's
liability coverage against insured's damages.

[18] Statutes 361 ~236
3 61 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361 Vl(B) Particular Classes of Statutes
36lk236 k. Remedial statutes. Most Cited
Cases
Remedial legislation is to be liberally con-

217 Insurance
2 l 7XIII Contracts and Po Iicies
217XIII(A) In General
217k 1720 Validity and Enforceability
217kl725 k. Public policy. Most Cited
Cases

Insurance 217 ~2973
217 Insurance
217XXIV Avoidance
217XXIV(A) In General
217k2971 Conditions Precedent
2 I 7k2973 k. Effect of insured's breach.
Most Cited Cases

Insurance 217 ~3039
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217 Insurance
2 l 7XXV Forfeiture
2 l 7XXV(A) In General
2 l 7k3037 Conditions Subsequent
2 l 7k3039 k. Effect of breach. Most
Cited Cases
To the extent that a tenn in an insurance policy
requiring the occurrence of a condition is unenforceable for public policy reasons, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of the condition unless its
occurrence was an essential part of the agreed exchange.

[21] Statutes 361 €==278.5
3 61 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(D) Retroactivity
361 k278.4 Prospective Construction
361 k278.5 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases

Statutes 361 €==278.7
3 61 Statutes
361 VI Construction and Operation
361Vl(D) Retroactivity
36lk278.7 k. Express retroactive provisions. Most Cited Cases
No statute is retroactive unless the legislature
expressly declares that it is. West's LC.A. § 73-10 I .

times change.

[23] Contracts 95 €==138(6)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95kl35 Effect of Illegality
95k I 3 8 Relief of Parties
95k 138(6) k. Necessity of raising
objection. Most Cited Cases
The duty to avoid enforcing an invalid contract
tenn is so strong that the court must raise the public
policy issue sua sponte if necessary.

[24] Contracts 95 €==108(1)
9 5 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95kl08 Public Policy in General
95kl08(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The court must not enforce any contract at any
stage in the litigation in which it becomes apparent
that the provision contravenes public policy; thus,
whenever the court discovers that a provision is invalid, the court must refuse to enforce it.

[25] Contracts 95 €==108(1)
[22] Contracts 95 €==108(1)
95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95k!08 Public Policy in General
95k I 08(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
It is the court's responsibility not to enforce a
contract provision that is contrary to public policy;
public policy is not static, but may change as the
relevant factual situation and the thinking of the

95 Contracts
951 Requisites and Validity
95I(F) Legality of Object and of Consideration
95kl08 Public Policy in General
95kl08(1) k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
Contracts can be eviscerated by a subsequent
change in public policy.

[26] Insurance 217 €==3586
217 Insurance
2 l 7XXX1 Civil Practice and Procedure
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217k3584 Costs and Attorney Fees
217k3586 k. Appeals. Most Cited Cases
Insured, who prevailed on appeal of summary
judgment granted to her underinsured motorist
(VIM) insurer, from whom she sought VIM benefits arising from a car accident with tortfeasor, was
not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, as she had
not yet established that an amount, if any, was
justly due to her under policy, but had merely prevailed in having summary judgment entered against
her vacated, which judgment was based on policy's
invalid exhaustion clause. West's LC.A.
§
41-1839(1).

**814 Johnson Olson Chartered, Pocatello, for Appellant. L. Charles Johnson argued.
Trout, Jones, Gledhill Fuhrman, PA., Boise, for Respondent. Christopher P. Graham argued.

W. JONES, Justice.
*621 I. NATURE OF THE CASE
In this case, an underinsured-motorist claimant
asks this Court to invalidate an "exhaustion clause"
requiring her to exhaust the full limits of the tortfeasor's insurance policy before being eligible for
underinsured-motorist benefits.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Marcie Hill, the appellant, was injured in a
two-car accident with Andrea Hamilton in November of 2005. Andrea, who was fifteen years old,
was talking on a cell phone when she unexpectedly
turned her vehicle left in front of Hill's, who was
approaching in the opposing lane of traffic. Hill
suffered injuries to her back and to her knee. Although she has received medical treatment, Hill
claims that she still suffers from knee pain and loss
of mobility for which she needs arthroscopic surgery.
At the time of the accident, Andrea's car was
covered by an automobile-insurance policy held by
her parents, Joseph and Jacqueline Hamilton. The
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Hamiltons' policy provided for up to $25,000 in
bod ily-inj urycoverage. Hi l lhadanunderinsured-motorist ("VIM") policy with American Family Mutual
Insurance Company ("American Family"), the respondent, for up to $100,000 per person. The policy
contained an "exhaustion clause" requiring her to
deplete all of the tortfeasor's bodily-injury insurance before she could collect underinsurance benefits.
Hill filed suit against the Hamiltons but settled
for $1000 less than the Hamiltons' $25,000 policy
Iimits rather than litigating the case. She then asserted a c !aim for an additional $18,000 against American Family, an amount that included credit for the
$1000 that she did not collect from the tortfeasor.
American Family nonetheless denied the claim because Hill had not yet "exhausted" the tortfeasor's
bodily-injury policy. Hill then filed this lawsuit
against American Family alleging breach of contract and fraud and the parties submitted crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court
granted summary judgment to American Family,
finding that the exhaustion clause unambiguously
required Hill to exhaust the Hamiltons' bodily-injury policy limits before she could receive UIM benefits. The court also found there to be no countervailing public policy in Idaho that overrides the
plain language of the contract and allows Hill to recover. On appeal, Hill contends that because insurers are now statutorily mandated *622 **815 to
offer UIM coverage in Idaho, the exhaustion clause
offends public policy by requiring her to litigate her
claim against the Hamiltons before being eligible to
receive benefits.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court properly granted
summary judgment to American Family on
Hill's claim for UIM benefits.
2. Whether Hill is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
IV. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3][4] This Court applies the same stand-
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ard as the district court when reviewing a grant of a
motion for summary judgment. Shawver v. Hucklebeny Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d
685, 691 (2004). Since filing cross-motions for
summary judgment does not change the standard of
review, the Court evaluates each motion on its merits. Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 206, 998
P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000). Summary judgment is
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "This
Court will liberally construe the record in favor of
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and will draw all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in favor of that party." Arreguin v.
Farmers ins. Co., 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d
498, 500 (2008). The entire record is freely reviewed to determine if either side was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law and to detenn ine whether inferences drawn by the district
court are reasonably supported by the record. Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho
630,634,226 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).

V. ANALYSIS
A. The Exhaustion Clause Is Void as Contrary to
Public Policy
The dispositive issue here is whether American
Family may rely on an exhaustion clause to deny
Hill's UIM benefits solely because she settled for
just under the tortfeasor's policy limits. The thrust
of Hill's appeal is that the exhaustion clause contravenes Idaho's public policy of requiring U!M coverage, which is embodied in l.C. § 41-2502(1 ). Section 41-2502(1) requires all insurance carriers to
offer UIM coverage with their policies. FNi Hill
argues that this Court should adopt the doctrine of
"constructive exhaustion" to allow her to collect
UIM benefits above the tortfeasors' policy limits
even if she settles for less than those limits. American Family responds that Idaho case law creates no
public policy with respect to UIM claims.

FNl. This provision provides in relevant part:
[N]o owner's or operator's policy of motor vehicle liability insurance ... shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this
state with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this
state unless coverage is provided therein
or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured
and underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting there- from.
J.C. § 41-2502(1) (emphasis added representing the 2008 amendment).

I. The Exhaustion Clause Unambiguously Requires
Hill to Exhaust the Tortfeasor's Insurance Policy
[5][6][7] A preliminary issue is to determine
the legal effect of the exhaustion clause. A contract
must be interpreted according to the plain meaning
of the words used if the language is clear and unambiguous. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho
Farm Bureau ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115
P.3d 751, 754 (2005). An insurance policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different
interpretations. Armstrong v. Farmers ins. Co., 143
Idaho 135, 137, 139 P.3d 737, 739 (2006). This
Court freely reviews the question of whether an insurance contract is ambiguous. Clark v. Prudential
Prop. & Cas. ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d
242, 245 (2003).
[8] Hill does not dispute that the UIM provision is clear. It reads:

**816 *623 We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury which an insured person is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle ....
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We will pay under this coverage only after the
limits of liability under any bodily liability bonds
or policies have been exhausted by payment of
judgments or settlements.
This language is boilerplate in the insurance industry, and a number of other jurisdictions have
found virtually identical wordings to be unambiguous. E.g. Robinette v. Am. liberty Ins. Co., 720
F.Supp. 577, 579 (S.D.Miss.1989); Birchfield v.
Nationwide Ins., 317 Ark. 38, 875 S.W.2d 502, 503
(1994). The clause explicitly creates a condition
precedent to UIM benefits, entitling Hill to coverage only if she settles or receives a payment for the
tortfeasor's policy limits. See Maroun v. Wyreless
Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984
(2005) ("A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must occur, before performance under a contract becomes due."
( quotation omitted)).

2. Exhaustion Clauses in U!M Insurance Contracts
Are Void Because They Violate Idaho State Public
Policy
[9][10][11][12][13] Next, this Court must determine whether the exhaustion clause violates public policy, which is a question of law. Quiring v.
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 566, 944 P.2d 695, 701
(1997). The "liberty of contract is not an absolute
and unlimited right, but upon the contrary is always
subservient to the public welfare." J.F. v. D.B., I 16
Ohio St.3d 363, 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (2007)
(citation omitted). "[T]he courts will not hesitate to
declare void as against public policy contractual
provisions which clearly tend to the injury of the
public in some way." 17 A C.J.S. Contracts § 218
(2010). "The usual test applied by courts in determining whether a contract offends public policy and
is antagonistic to the public interest is whether the
contract has a tendency toward such an evil." Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 240 P.2d 833,
837 (1952) (emphasis added). "Public policy may
be found and set forth in the statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution." Bakker v. Thunder
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Spring-Wareham, l.l.C., 141 Idaho 185, 189, 108
P.3d 332, 336 (2005). Whether an insurance contract is against public policy "is to be determined
from all the facts and circumstances of each case."
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, I 00 Idaho 883, 887,
606 P .2d 987, 991 (1980). In addition, "analogous
cases involving the same general principles may be
looked to by the court in arriving at a satisfactory
conclusion." Smith v. Idaho Hosp. Serv., 89 Idaho
499, 504, 406 P.2d 696, 699 (1965).
[ 14] American Family is correct in that, as of
yet, Idaho case law has only held that "[n]either the
Idaho legislature nor the courts have declared that
there exists a public policy applicable to underinsured motorist coverage." Meeker/ v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 600, 701 P.2d 217,220
(1985); accord Er/and v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 136
Idaho 131, 133, 30 P.3d 286,288 (2001). The Court
repeatedly indicated, however, that the sole reason
there was no clear public policy regarding UIM
coverage was because "Idaho statutes do not regulate underinsured motorist coverage." Andrae v.
Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Prag. Underwriters,
145 Idaho 33, 36, 175 P.3d 195, 198 (2007) (citing
Meeker/, I 08 Idaho at 600, 701 P.2d at 220). We
have rejected public policy challenges related to
UIM policies only because "our statutes do not require an automobile insurer to include underinsured
vehicle coverage in its policies or even to offer this
coverage to its insureds." Farmers Ins. Co. v. Buffa,
119 Idaho 345, 347, 806 P.2d 438, 440 (1991); see
also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scarlett, 116 Idaho
820, 822, 780 P .2d 142, 144 (1989) (same).
In 2008, however, the Legislature did begin to
require insurers to offer UIM coverage. It amended
J.C. § 41-2502(1) to expressly require insurance
companies to offer such provisions with automobile
policies. Act of March 5, 2008, ch. 69, § I, 2008
Idaho Sess. Laws 183, 183. Insureds now may only
refuse this coverage if they do so in writing. Id
( codified at LC. § 41-2502(2)). The amendment requires
insurers to offer protection against
"underinsured motor vehicles," *624 **817 defined
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as vehicles insured with limits at least at the statutory minimum for bodily injury or death.FN 2 § 2,
2008 IDAHO SESS. LAWS At 184 (coDified at i.e.
§ 41-2503(2)). The Legislature accordingly intends
to protect Idaho's citizens from drivers carrying
policies above the statutorily required policy levels
but who have insurance insufficient to compensate
their tort victims.
FN2. The minimum amount of required insurance is $25,000 per person and $50,000
per accident. LC. § 49-117( 18). Subject to
some limited exceptions, nobody may operate a motor vehicle on public highways
in Idaho without carrying the statutory
minimum amount of liability insurance. id
§ 49-1428(1).
The Legislature apparently enacted the amendment for two reasons. First, the most obvious is the
threat that underinsured motorists pose to public
safety. Idahoans suffering catastrophic injuries
from drivers carrying insufficient coverage could
find themselves without redress if they have no
UIM policy.
Second, without UIM coverage, Idahoans injured by a totally uninsured driver sometimes recover more than those injured by underinsured
drivers. Many drivers in Idaho injured by underinsured motorists had little recourse if they purchased uninsured-motorist ("UM") policies but had
no UIM coverage, since those policies provided no
benefits if the underinsured tortfeasor had at least
the minimum required amount of insurance coverage. As this Court observed before the Legislature
implemented the UIM mandate, many drivers in
this state "may well be in a better position if a tortfeasor carries no insurance whatsoever rather than
carrying the minimum coverage mandated by the
statute," and that "the matter deserves legislative
attention." Blackburn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., l 08 Idaho 85, 90, 697 P.2d 425, 430 (l 985);
see also Longworth, 538 A.2.d at 424 (stating that
there is no reason why UM claimants should have
immediate recourse against their insurer but not
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UIM claimants). The Legislature has addressed this
anomaly by mandating insurers to at least offer
UIM coverage in all insurance policies.
[15] Before analyzing the public-policy issue
further, however, it is necessary to note that the
Director of the Department of Insurance presumably approved the terms in Hill's insurance policy.
Absent an assertion to the contrary, this Court presumes that the insurance policy was submitted to
the Director and was found to comport with public
policy. Am. Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho
394, 399, 94 P.3d 699, 704 (2004). The Legislature
has empowered the Director to invalidate an insurance policy for a number of reasons, including because it contains "any inconsistent, ambiguous, or
misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions
which deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract, or
which are unfairly prejudicial to the policy holder."
J.C. § 41-1813(2). Hill does not contend that the
Director failed to review or disapproved her policy
with American Family.
[ I 6] The Dissent contends that the Court
should simply defer to the Director and hold that
the policy comports with public policy, but the fact
that the Director may have approved these contract
terms merely creates a presumption that they are
valid and is not conclusive. Hansen v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. ins.
112 Idaho 663, 667-68. 735
P.2d 974, 978-79 (1987). Of course, even if the
Director has reviewed the terms in this case, the insurance policy here was executed before the Legislature amended the Code to require insurers to offer
UIM coverage. The Director could not have known
about the Legislature's new public-policy decisions
at that time.
[ 17] Nearly every jurisdiction with a statutory
UIM mandate similar to Idaho's has found exhaustion clauses to be contrary to public policy. E.g.
Country Mut. ins. Co. v. Fonk. 198 Ariz. 167, 7
P.3d 973, 978 (Ariz.Ct.App.2000); Taylor v. Gov't
Employees ins. Co., 90 Hawai'i 302, 978 P.2d 740,
746, 751 (1999); Buzzard v. Farmers ins. Co., 824
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P.2d I I 05, 1112 (Okla.1992); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Faris, '27 Mass.App.Ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d
1097, 1099-100 (1989); Chambers v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 442 Pa.Super. I 55, 658 A.2d 1346, 1348
( 1995); *625**818Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vassas,
139 N.J. 163,652 A.2d 162,166 (1995); Mann v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620,
621 (1992) overruled on other grounds by White v.
Cont'! Ins. Co., 119 Nev. 114, 65 P.3d 1090, I 092
(2003). But see Ploen v. Union Ins. Co., 253 Neb.
867, 573 N.W.2d 436, 443 (I 998) (rejecting a public policy challenge).FN3 These cases comport with
the overall majority position nationwide that exhaustion clauses are void and, under the constructive-exhaustion doctrine/N~ do not prevent an insured from "exhausting" the tortfeasor's policy by
settling for an amount less than the policy limits.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 76 Cal.App.4th 797,
90 Cal.Rptr.2d 697, 700 (1999); Horace Mann Ins.
Co. v. Adkins, 215 W.Va. 297, 599 S.E.2d 720, 729
n. 12 (2004); e.g. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Knight, 506 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987);
Metcalf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944
S.W.2d 151, 153 (Ky.Ct.App.1997). To prevent the
UIM carrier from paying extra-contractual benefits,
however, "the underinsurer always is allowed to
credit the full amount of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage against the insured's damages." Hamilton
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 Wash.2d
721, 733 P .2d 213, 217 ( 1987); accord Sorber v.
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 451 Pa.Super. 507, 680
A.2d 881,882 (1996).
FN3. American Family relies heavily on a
Wisconsin case, Danbeck v. American
Fami~y Mut. Ins. Co., 245 Wis.2d 186, 629
N.W.2d 150 (2001), as an instance when a
court rejected a public-policy challenge
and enforced the literal language of an exhaustion clause. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, however, did not incorporate the
state's statutory UIM mandate into its public-policy analysis, nor even mention that
such a mandate existed, as the publicpolicy challenge in that case apparently
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rested only on common law. Id at I 56
(analyzing only an intermediate court's ruling on state public policy). Indeed, jurisdictions in which a UIM statute did not
play into the legal analysis have tended to
be more evenly divided on whether to enforce exhaustion clauses. Compare Birchfield, 875 S. W.2d at 504 (enforcing the exhaustion clause as written), State v. Mummert, 879 S. W.2d 525, 528-29 (Mo.1994)
(same), with Omni Ins. Co. v. Foreman,
802 So.2d 195, 197 (Ala.200 I) (holding
that the UIM claimant did not forfeit her
benefits by settling for less than the policy
limits), and Augustine v. Simonson, 283
Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116, 120 (Mont.1997)
(implementing the constructive-exhaustion
doctrine). Here, of course, a statute does
directly bear on the public-policy analysis,
so these cases are inapplicable.
FN4. Although most cases adopt this position, they do not necessarily use the tenn
"constructive exhaustion." Instead, many
jurisdictions state that the UIM carrier's
payments are "offset" by the tortfeasor's
policy limits. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v.
Adkins, 215 W.Ya. 297, 599 S.E.2d 720,
727 (2004).
Conversely, nearly every state that has rejected
the constructive-exhaustion doctrine has done so
because a statute either expressly allowed or expressly required UIM coverage to be conditioned
on an exhaustion clause like the one at issue here.
FN 5 The Idaho statute, by comparison, simply requires insurance policies delivered or issued in
Idaho to contain underinsurance coverage unless
expressly rejected in writing by the insured. I.C. §
41-2502(1 ), (2).FN 6 The Idaho Code neither requires nor expressly pennits exhaustion clauses.
FN5. See Curran v. Progressive Nw. Ins.
Co., 29 P.3d 829, 832-33 (Alaska 2001)
(citing Alaska Stat. § 28.20.445); Hurley,
90 Cal.Rptr.2d at 701 (citing Cal. Ins.Code
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§ l 1580.2(p)(3)); Continental Ins. Co. v.
Cebe-Habersky, 214 Conn. 209, 571 A.2d
I 04, 106 (1990) (citing Conn. Gen.Stat. §
38-l 75c(b)(l)); Daniels v. Johnson, 270
Ga. 289, 509 S.E.2d 4 I, 43 (1998) (citing
Ga.Code Ann. §§ 33-7-1 l(b)(])(D)(ii),
33-24--41.1); Lemna v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 273 Ill.App.3d 90, 209 Ill.Dec. 942,
652 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1995) (citing 215 lll.
Comp. Stat. 5/143a-2(7) (1992)); Federal
Ins. Co. v. Watnick, 80 N.Y.2d 539, 592
N.Y.S.2d 624, 607 N.E.2d 771, 774 (1992)
(citing N.Y. Ins. Law § 3420(f)(2)); see
also McCrary v. Byrd, 148 N.C.App. 630,
559 S.E.2d 821, 825 (2002) (citing N.C.
Gen.Stat. § 20-279.21 (b)( 4) (1999), stating
that exhaustion occurs when the policy
limits "have been paid upon the claim").
FN6. Oregon, by contrast, has invalidated
exhaustion clauses primarily on statutory
grounds. Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323 Or.
291,918 P.2d 95, 99, 101 (1996).
[ 18] This Court must therefore carefully evaluate whether requiring insureds to comply with UIM
exhaustion clauses would thwart the Legislature's
goal of protecting motorists from underinsured
drivers. Because I.C. § 41-5202( I) is designed to
remedy the public-safety problem created by underinsured drivers, it is a remedial statute. "It is a wellknown canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation is to be liberally construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature." *626**819
State v. Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor & Equip.
Co., 129 Idaho 565,567,929 P.2d 741,743 (1996).
Other courts invalidating exhaustion clauses
also observe that UIM statutes are remedial in
nature. They reason that the insured's ability to recover UIM benefits should be "scrupulously
guarded" because "UIM coverage is intended to
provide excess coverage to compensate an insured
against losses for which there would otherwise be
no coverage." FN 7 Horace Mann, 599 S.E.2d at
725-26. Consequently, "[t]he exhaustion clause

must be construed as it was intended, i.e., a
threshold requirement and not a barrier to underinsured motorist insurance coverage." Bogan v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 22, 521
N.E.2d 447, 453 (1988) overruled on other grounds
by McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 45
Ohio St.3d 27, 543 N .E.2d 456 ( 1989).
FN7. Some states take this a step further,
holding that any attempt to condition, dilute, or limit UM or UIM coverage is void.
Union Ins. Co. v. Houtz, 883 P.2d 1057,
I 063 (Colo.1994); Brown v. USAA Cas.
Ins. Co., 17 Kan.App.2d 547, 840 P.2d
1203, 1205 (1992).
There might be reasons for a claimant to settle
below policy limits that are unrelated to the amount
of damages the claimant has suffered. Because it
may be necessary or advantageous for insureds to
accept a settlement, "[t]he insured should have the
right to accept what he or she considers the best settlement available against the tortfeasor without relinquishing under-insurance protection." Rucker v.
Nat'/ Gen. Ins. Co., 442 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa
1989). The insured might wish to settle if the insurance limits are too low to justify trial. Olivas v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 564,
567 (Tex.App.1993). The insured might also have
immediate financial or medical reasons for needing
to settle the UIM claim below policy limits. Cobb v.
Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589, 597
(S.C.Ct.App.1997). If the insured has to exhaust the
policy limits to keep his or her UIM coverage, the
tortfeasor's insurance company could force the insured to go to court by offering just less than the
policy limits. "In effect then, the victim is denied
the perfectly reasonable choice of saving months, if
not years, of delay, trial preparation expense, and
all the ensuing wear and tear by simply accepting
the offer." Longworth v. Van Houten, 223
NJ.Super.
174,
538
A.2d
414,
423
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1988). The litigation would
also likely reduce the insured's net recovery. Id.
There would be many instances where the claimant
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receives a greater recovery by settling than by paying a lawyer to pursue a lengthy and contentious
trial for only a small amount more than the settlement offer.
Litigation would create drastic de lays for litigants who may have suffered serious injuries and
desperately need to collect benefits. These delays
would be exacerbated by the fact that the claimant
may have to undergo further arbitration against the
UIM carrier after obtaining a judgment from the
tortfeasor. See Harper v. Providence Washington
Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 282, 284-85 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000)
(permitting arbitration against a UIM carrier while
the insured's claim against the tortfeasor was still
pending).
UIM claimants in Idaho subject to exhaustion
clauses like this one would have even greater difficulty collecting UIM benefits in collisions caused
by more than one defendant. Although this particular issue is not presently before this Court, it highlights another reason for which many other jurisdictions have refused to enforce exhaustion clauses. In
such a case, the claimant would still have to exhaust "any bodily injury liability bonds or policies"
before being able to collect UIM payments. The
claimant might not be able to exhaust one of the
tortfeasors' policy limits, especially if that tortfeasor was less liable relative to the other defendants.
See I.C. § 6-802 (permitting the court to apportion
damages among defendants). As a New York court
reasoned, requiring the insured to exhaust all the insurance applicable to all vehicles involved in an accident "would emasculate the endorsement's intended effect ... to provide coverage over and above
the limits of the tortfeasor's insurance." Colonial
Penn Ins. Co. v. Salti, 84 A.D.2d 350, 446
N.Y.S.2d 77, 79 (N.Y.App.Div.1982). Due to the
inequity that UIM claimants might face when confronted with multiple tortfeasors, other courts have
permitted UIM insureds to pursue arbitration
against *627 **820 the insurer at the same time
claims are pending against multiple tortfeasors.
Leslie v. W.H. Transp. Co., 338 F.Supp.2d 684, 689
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(S.D.W.Va.2004); see also Gen. Accident Ins. Co.
v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 603 A.2d 385, 387
(1992) (requiring the claimant to exhaust only one
tortfeasor's policy even though a statute expressly
required exhaustion of all policies).
UIM claimants, in other words, are better
equipped than their UIM carriers to most efficiently
resolve claims against the tortfeasor. They are in
the best position to determine whether it is worth
the time and expense to litigate.
The Dissent asserts that the Legislature's 2008
UIM amendment "does not in any way purport to
address the procedures for making a claim under
such coverage," and therefore does not indicate that
there is a legislative policy aimed at protecting
Idahoans from underinsured motorists. The Legislature clearly enacted the UIM amendments to protect the citizens of this State from being undercompensated for their injuries, and exhaustion clauses
impose a substantive, not merely procedural,
obstacle in front of accident victims seeking UIM
benefits. Requiring victims to actually exhaust the
tortfeasor's policy limits is not the kind of UIM
coverage the Legislature contemplated. FNs
FN8. The Dissent also suggests that the
Court is simply protecting accident victims
who fail to read their insurance policies before settling for less than the tortfeasor's
policy limits. Nothing in this Opinion
should be read to relieve policyholders
from having to read and understand their
policies. As discussed throughout this
Opinion, however, exhaustion clauses create myriad problems for insureds regardless of whether they read their policies. Insureds, aware of their exhaustion clauses,
may have to undergo protracted and needless litigation despite needing immediate
medical or financial support.
Apart from the remedial nature of the UIMmandate statute is the entirely separate public interest in judicial economy. "Public policy favors the
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resolution of controversies and uncertainties
through compromise and settlement rather than
through litigation." 15A Am.Jur.2d Compromise &
Settlement § 5. Exhaustion clauses harm the public
interest in judicial economy in two ways. First, they
encourage tortfeasors' insurers to litigate against
UIM claimants. As previously mentioned, the tortfeasor's insurer could use an exhaustion clause to
compel litigation by offering to settle for only just
under the policy limits. The injured collision victim
could have to endure needless delay and expense
litigating or lose his/her benefits.
Second, Idaho's courts will have to contend
with unnecessary litigation merely so that VIM
claimants can preserve their benefits. Schmidt v.
Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256. 260 (Minn.1983)
(superseded by statute); Augustine v. Simonson, 283
Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116, 120 (1997). As this Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court have held in cases discussing collateral estoppel and res judicata, reducing repetitive or unnecessary litigation is a legitimate goal, as it frees up judicial resources for legitimate disputes. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
94, IOI S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308, 313 (1980)
(stating that both collateral estoppel and res judicata conserve judicial resources); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645,
649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 559 (1979) (similar); Brown
v. Fe/sen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209,
60 L.Ed.2d 767, 771 (1979) (holding that res judicata "frees the courts to resolve other disputes");
Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., lnc., 141 Idaho 604, 617,
1 I4 P.3d 974, 987 (2005) ( collateral estoppel);
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,
805 (2002) (res judicata); Anderson v. City of Pocatello, I 12 Idaho 176, 183,731 P.2d 171, 178 (1986)
(collateral estoppel); see also Pines, Inc. v. Bossingham, 131 Idaho 714, 717, 963 P.2d 397, 400
(Ct.App.1998) (collateral estoppel).
Promoting an efficient judiciary ultimately benefits the public. Given all the potential reasons
that a VIM claimant may need to settle for just under policy limits, it would be contrary to principles

of judicial economy to require full exhaustion by
litigation or settlement. Cobb, 482 S.E.2d at 596-97 .
[ 19] For the foregoing reasons, we now hold
exhaustion clauses in LllM automobile policies to
be void, unenforceable, and severable in Idaho. To
collect against his or her insurer, a VIM insured
may proceed against the VIM carrier, who must investigate and *628 **821 attempt to resolve the
claim in good faith regardless of whether the insured settled with the tortfeasor's insurer or, if so,
for how much. Taylor, 978 P.2d at 751. The VIM
carrier will receive credit for the full amount of the
tortfeasor's policy, regardless of the insured's actual
recovery.
We decline to implement the constructive-exhaustion doctrine or to otherwise replace exhaustion clauses with any other judicially created language. This is primarily to prevent any confusion
over how much settlement the insured must extract
from the tortfeasor before approaching the VIM
carrier for benefits. Hill suggested that courts
should require the settlement amount to be
"reasonable" in relationship to the tortfeasor's
policy limits. A "reasonableness" requirement is
unnecessary for three reasons. First, the VIM
claimant, not his or her insurer, has to absorb the
gap between the settlement and the tortfeasor's
policy limits. So long as there is no prejudice resulting from the settlement, there is simply no need
for courts to determine whether the amount was
"reasonable." Second, the UIM claimant is in the
best position to efficiently resolve a claim by
weighing the provable facts of the case, the financial or medical need for quick settlement, and the
potential costs of litigation. A reasonableness requirement might obstruct otherwise efficient claim
resolution or prolong the process by calling on the
courts to evaluate whether the settlement amount
was "reasonable." Third, asking judges to determine whether settlements are reasonable would draw
the parties back into court and undermine the goal
of promoting swift claim resolution and judicial
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economy.
[20] Although Hill's exhaustion clause is void,
the rest of her policy remains intact. "To the extent
that a term requiring the occurrence of a condition
is unenforceable [for public-policy reasons], a court
may excuse the non-occurrence of the condition unless its occurrence was an essential part of the
agreed exchange." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § I 85 ( I 98 I); see also Nelson v. Armstrong,
99 Idaho 422, 426, 582 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1978) (
"Where a transaction is composed of both benign
and offensive components and the different portions are severable, the unobjectionable parts are
generally enforceable."). Hill will not receive a better deal than she bargained for if she can show that
an underinsured tortfeasor is liable to her for an
amount exceeding his policy limits and then sets off
those policy limits against her UIM recovery. Augustine, 940 P.2d at 121; Rucker, 442 N. W .2d at
117; see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch,
742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir.1984) (stating that the
court "will not enforce the remainder of the contract if the result will be to give the promisee a substantially better deal than he had bargained for").
3. Subsequent Changes in State Law That Are Designed to Protect the Public Welfare Can Invalidate
a Contract Provision on Public Policy Grounds
American Family contends that since the Legislature only began requiring insurers to offer UIM
coverage in 2009, no statutory public policy aimed
at protecting the pub lie from underinsured drivers
existed when Hill entered into her insurance contract in July of 2005. See § 1, 2008 Idaho Sess.
Laws at 183-84 (amending LC. § 41-2502 effective January I, 2009). American Family reasons that
this Court would be applying the statute retroactively if it allowed Hill to collect UIM benefits
without having settled for the tortfeasors' policy
limits.

[21] It is true that § 41-2502 is not retroactive.
No statute is retroactive unless the Legislature expressly declares that it is. J.C. § 73-101; Henderson
v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444,448,915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996)

. "A statute will not be given a retroactive construction by which it will impose liabilities not existing
at the time of its passage." Doe v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 148 Idaho 427, 431, 224 P.3d 494, 498 (2009)
(quoting Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499,
509, 321 P.2d 589. 594 (I 958)). The Legislature
did not expressly provide for its amendment to §
41-2502 to apply to preexisting insurance policies.
In addition, there is plenty of authority holding that
contracts are interpreted according to the law at the
time the contract is executed. E.g. Smith v. Idaho
Hosp. Serv., Inc., 89 Idaho 499, 503, 406 P.2d 696,
698 (1965); *629**822Northland Ins. Co. v.
Boise's Best Autos & Repairs, 132 Idaho 228, 23 I,
970 P.2d 21, 24 (Ct.App.1997), rev'd on other
grounds, 131 Idaho 432, 958 P.2d 589 (1998)
(applying the rule specifically to insurance contracts).
[22][23][24] Nonetheless, regardless of when
J.C. § 41-2502(1) was enacted, it is the Court's responsibility not to enforce a contract provision that
is contrary to public policy. "Public policy is not
static, but may change as the relevant factual situation and the thinking of the times change." Brown
v. Snohomish Cnty. Phys. Corp., 120 Wash.2d 747,
845 P.2d 334, 338 (I 993). The duty to avoid enforcing an invalid contract term is so strong that
Idaho's courts must raise the public policy issue sua
sponte if necessary. Quiring, 130 Idaho at 567, 944
P.2d at 702. The Court does not invalidate a contract only if it was void at the time it was entered.
Instead, the Court must not enforce any contract "at
any stage in the litigation" in which it becomes apparent that the provision contravenes public policy.
Id. Thus, whenever the Court discovers that a provision is invalid, the Court must refuse to enforce it.
[25] It is widely accepted that contracts can be
eviscerated by a subsequent change in public
policy. E.g. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Jarrett,
42 F.Supp. 723, 730 (M.D.Ga.1942); V. & S. Bottle
Co. v. Mountain Gas Co., 261 Pa. 523, I 04 A. 667,
667 (19 I 8) (per curiam); Dorr v. Chesapeake &
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Ohio Ry. Co., 78 W.Va. 150, 88 S.E. 666, 667
(19 I 6); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Emp. Ass'n of Willingboro Sch., 178 NJ.Super. 477, 429 A.2d 429,
430 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1981) (noting that contracts should be interpreted according to the law existing when they are formed but also that changes in
the law may make a contract illegal). Courts have
broadly articulated this rule. The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that "no contract can properly be
carried into effect ... which, being made consistently with the rules of law at the time, has become
illegal in virtue of some subsequent law." Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 485,
31 S.Ct. 265, 271, 55 L.Ed. 297, 304 (191 I)
(quotation omitted).
Although there is expansive language in many
cases, a rule permitting any change in public policy
to eviscerate preexisting contracts would not serve
Idaho well. Such a rule does not account for private
agreements between parties that are unlikely to endanger the public welfare. A more refined approach
is to nullify only those agreements that violate state
policies designed to protect the public good, either
because the object of the agreement is inherently
harmful or because a condition in the agreement
would, in the aggregate, tend to harm the public.
See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 570, 31 S.Ct. 259, 263, 55
L.Ed. 328, 339--40 (1911) (holding that the state legislatures may nullify existing contracts "where the
parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the
public health demands that one party to the contract
shall be protected against himself'); I 7A C.J.S.
Contracts § 29 (stating that "legislation in exercise
of a state's police power, or by subsequent statute
announcing new public policy" can avoid preexisting contracts). This approach prevents relatively
unforeseeable changes in public policy from undermining otherwise legitimate business arrangements.
See Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown,
137 N.J. 238, 645 A.2d JOO, 105 (1994) (upholding
municipal-land leases that had not undergone pubIic bidding as required by a new statute).

For example, New York limits the situations in
which a shift in public policy can nullify contract
terms. The rule there only applies to "acts of the
Legislature which are strictly measures of public
policy, not to those which are intended primarily to
establish or affect the rights of parties to each other." Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 450 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214,
86 A.D.2d 459, 461 (N.Y.App.Div.1982). New
York's courts have considered voiding contract
terms only when upholding them would harm the
public or would be enforced at public expense.
Compare CKC Chiropractic v. Republic W. Ins.
Co., 5 Misc.3d 492, 784 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352
(N.Y.Civ.Ct.2004) (discussing whether an insurer
had to pay benefits to an unlicensed medical provider), Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d 188,
738 N.Y.S.2d 650, 764 N.E.2d 950, 953 (2001)
(discussing whether a woman could agree to waive
support from an ex-spouse), and G!engariff Corp. v.
Snook, 122 Misc.2d 784, 471 N.Y.S.2d 973,
977-79 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1984)**823 *630 (refusing to
enforce a contract to pay a medical provider more
than what the provider could collect under a new
Medicaid law), with Rotodyne, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of Ne½' York, 55 A.D.2d 600, 389 N.Y.S.2d
387, 388 (N. Y .App.Div.1976) (refusing to invalidate a subcontractor's waiver of mechanics-lien
rights against a general contractor). r-N 9 Although
we decline to adopt New York law on this subject,
these cases are instructive.
FN9. Notably, California does not allow
public-policy changes to affect preexisting
contracts. Bovard v. Am. Horse Enter., 201
Cal.App.3d 832, 247 Cal.Rptr. 340, 344 n.
3 (1988). Nonetheless, like New York, the
cases in which California courts refuse to
invalidate contracts due to changed public
policy apparently always involve private
rights between two arms-length parties.
E.g. Stephens v. S. Pac. Co., l 09 Cal. 86,
41 P. 783, 786 ( 1895) (refusing to invalidate a warehouse lease agreement where
leaseholder indemnified landowner for the
landowner's own negligence); Whitmire v.
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HK. Ferguson Co., 26 l Cal.App.2d 594,
68 Cal.Rptr. 78, 82 (1968) (refusing to invalidate an agreement in which a construction subcontractor indemnified the general
contractor for its negligence).

As explained above, Idaho's UIM mandate was
designed to protect the public from underinsured
motorists, and not merely to govern private relations between parties. The Legislature has required
that insurers offer UIM coverage to all motorists,
not UIM coverage conditioned on totally depleting
the tortfeasor's policy. Exhaustion clauses have no
purpose but to dilute Idahoans' protection against
underinsured drivers and to prevent insureds from
collecting legitimate claims. They are a product of
the insurance company's sophistication and bargaining power. See Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 118 ldaho 373, 377, 797 P.2d 81, 85 (1990)
(quotation omitted) (explaining that insurance companies enjoy a significant bargaining advantage
over insureds). They also impose additional litigation demands on the court system, which directly
impedes public access to the courtroom. These
threats to public safety and demands on the justice
system occur regardless of when the parties executed the insurance contract. Because exhaustion
clauses impinge on a state public policy designed to
protect the public we !fare, they are void in the State
of Idaho.rNio
FN I 0. The Dissent argues that exhaustion
clauses do indeed have a legitimate purpose, stating that our opinion today simply
indulges in "a belief in a grand conspiracy
among evil insurance companies." This assertion is hyperbole, as exhaustion clauses
are only a matter between one insurer and
insured-we
need
not
find
a
its
"conspiracy" to hold that this kind of
clause violates public policy. In any event,
the Dissent offers no legitimate alternative
reason why an insurer would insert such a
clause into its policies. It is possible that
exhaustion clauses are useful to ensure that

the tortfeasor actually could not fully compensate the accident victim, but they are
not necessary to accomplish this purpose if
insurance carriers receive credit for the full
limits of the tortfeasor's policy, as we hold
today.
The Dissent also refuses to suggest a leg1t1mate purpose for exhaustion clauses
because the clauses' purpose "was not an
issue litigated below," and the factual record on the matter is undeveloped. This
position misunderstands how a publicpolicy analysis works. Whether a contract term is illegal is not a factual inquiry but a legal one. Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 608, 200 P.3d
1153, 1157 (2009). Since neither American Family nor the Dissent can come up
with any legitimate reason to allow insurance companies to condition UIM
coverage in this way, exhaustion clauses
are illegal as a matter of law.
In summary, the exhaustion clause is void
based on Idaho's declared public policy aimed at
protecting its citizens from underinsured drivers
and on the doctrine of judicial economy, which here
includes shielding parties from excessive litigation
and preventing unnecessary demands on the judicial
system. Claimants need not exhaust the limits of the
tortfeasor's policy, but instead must credit to the
UIM insurer the gap between the settlement with
the tortfeasor's insurer, if any, and the policy limits.
Because Hill settled with the Hamiltons for just under their policy limits and is ready to credit the gap
to American Family, the summary judgment in favor of American Family is vacated.

B. Hill Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal
[26] Hill has also not established that American
Family actually owes her any amount under the
policy and is still therefore not entitled to fees on
appeal. The Idaho Code provides:
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Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or
contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature *631 **824 whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30)
days after proof of loss has been furnished as
provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to
pay to the person entitled thereto the amount
justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought
against the insurer in any court in this state or in
any arbitration for recovery under the terms of
the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable
as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration.
J.C. § 41-1839(1) (emphases added). If Hill
prevails on appeal, she has only succeeded in having the summary judgment against her vacated. Although the exhaustion clause would not bar her recovery, under I.C. § 41-1839(1) she still must establish the "amount justly due under [her] policy,"
if any. She therefore shall not receive attorney fees
on appeal.

VI. CONCLUSION
Because the exhaustion clause in Hill's UIM
policy with American Family violates public
policy, it cannot bar her recovery. The district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
American Family is therefore vacated and this case
is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Hill is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because she has not
yet established that an amount, if any, is justly due
under the policy. Costs to Appellant.
Justices BURDICK and J. JONES concur.
Chief Justice EISMANN, dissenting.
Because the majority usurps the authority of
the legislature and the director of the Department of
Insurance to strike a provision from an insurance
contract that the majority simply happens to dislike,
I respectfully dissent.
This case revolves around a policy provision
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which provides, with respect to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage, " We will pay under this
coverage only after the limits of liability under any
bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been
exhausted by payment of judgements or settlements." (Bold type in original.) This provision, an
exhaustion clause, is concededly unambiguous. The
majority strikes it from the insurance policy on the
ground that it allegedly violates public policy and
the newly created doctrine of judicial economy. As
will be shown, there is no recognized public policy
in Idaho that it violates and the doctrine of judicial
economy is nonsensical. In actuality, it is the majority opinion that violates public policy as expressly declared by statute.
Before addressing Idaho's public policy, I will
address the majority's assertion that "[n]early every
jurisdiction with a statutory UIM mandate similar
to Idaho's has found exhaustion clauses to be contrary to public policy." We would not condone our
children's misconduct based upon the excuse that
other kids were doing it too, and such an argument
does not validate the majority opinion. Whatever
may be the authority of courts in other jurisdictions
to modify insurance contracts, in Idaho "[c]ourts do
not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in
order to make them more equitable." Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41, 72
P.3d 877, 881 (2003); accord Losee v. Idaho Co.,
148 Idaho 2 I 9, 223, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009). The
exhaustion clause must violate the public policy of
Idaho, not that of some other state.
"Public policy may be found and set forth in
the statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution."
Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141
Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005). Thus,
the question is what statute, judicial decision, or
constitutional provision declares a public policy
that is violated by the exhaustion clause. Each of
the three sources of public policy will be addressed
separately.

1. Constitutional provision. Public policy may
be found in the Constitution. Id. The majority does
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not contend that the exhaustion clause violates any
constitutional provision.

2. Statute. The majority cites Idaho Code §
41-2502 as amended in 2008, but it is clear that the
exhaustion clause does not expressly or implicitly
violate any public policy declared by that statute.
First, that statute**825 *632 does not even apply to
the insurance policy in this case. It only applies to
"the issuance of any new policy or the first renewal
or replacement of any existing policy of motor
vehicle liability insurance with an effective date on
or after January !, 2009. " Idaho Code §
41-2502(3) (20IO) (emphasis added).FN 11 The insurance policy in this case had an effective date of
July I9, 2005, almost three and one-half years prior
to January I, 2009.FN 12 The majority's assertion
that the exhaustion clause in this policy violates
some public policy declared by the 2008 amendment to the statute is directly contrary to the legislature's expressly declared public policy regarding
the insurance policies to which the amendment applies.
FN 11. This subsection provides:
Prior to the issuance of any new policy
or the first renewal or replacement of
any existing policy of motor vehicle liability insurance with an effective date
on or after January 1, 2009, a named insured shall be provided a standard statement approved by the director of the department of insurance, explaining in
summary form, both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and the
different forms of underinsured motorist
coverage that might be available from
insurers in Idaho.
FN12. The policy stated that it was " EFFECTIVE
FROM
07-19-2005
TO
I 2-22-2005." (Bold type in original.)
Second, the statute requires insurance companies to offer UIM coverage, but Idaho Code §
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41-2502(2) grants the named insured "the right to
reject either or both uninsured motorist coverage or
underinsured motorist coverage." Because the insured has the right to reject UIM coverage entirely,
it is difficult to see how there is a public policy prohibiting an insured from entering into an insurance
contract that requires exhaustion of the limits of the
tortfeasor's liability policy before the insured can
collect UIM benefits.
Third, even if the 2008 amendment had applied
to the policy in this case, the statute does not expressly or implicitly address exhaustion clauses or
any of the procedures applicable to making a claim
under UIM coverage. The majority concedes, "The
Idaho Code neither requires nor expressly permits
exhaustion clauses," and the majority does not
identify any statutory provision even allegedly implicitly violated by the exhaustion clause. The 2008
amendment merely requires insurance companies to
offer underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in their
motor vehicle liability policies. It does not in any
way purport to address the procedures for making a
claim under such coverage. The majority cannot explain how a requirement that an insured establish
that the tortfeasor was in fact underinsured as a precondition to recovering UIM benefits violates the
public policy requiring insurance companies to
merely offer UIM coverage in their motor vehicle
liability policies. It states, "The Legislature clearly
enacted the UIM amendments to protect the citizens
of this State from being undercompensated for their
injuries .... " It also refers to "Idaho's UIM mandate
[that] was designed to protect the public from underinsured motorists .... " The majority seems to
think that UIM coverage is mandatory, rather than
coverage that the insured has the option to purchase. The majority's hyperbole indicates it believes that a statute simply requiring insurance
companies to offer UIM coverage will somehow
magically reduce accidents caused by underinsured
motorists.
In fact, it is the majority opinion, not the exhaustion clause, that violates public policy as ex-
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pressly declared by statute. Idaho Code §
41-2502(!) requires that insurers offer uninsured
and underinsured coverage in their motor vehicle liability insurance policies " under provisions approved by the director of the department of insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured and underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom." (Emphasis added.) The public policy declared by statute is that the director of the Department of Insurance, not this Court, has the authority
to determine whether provisions of an insurance
policy that do not conflict with any express statutory requirement are consistent with public policy.
There was a time when this Court correctly refused
to usurp the authority granted by the legislature to
the director.

**826 *633 In Hammon v. Farmers Insurance
Co. of Idaho, 109 Idaho 286, 707 P.2d 397 (] 985),
the insureds were injured when they swerved to
avoid an oncoming vehicle that had crossed into
their lane of travel and crashed. The uninsured motorist coverage of their insurance policy included
injury by '' hit-and-run" vehicles, but it required
that such vehicles have "physical contact" with the
insured or the vehicle the insured was occupying.
By swerving, the insureds had avoided colliding
with the oncoming vehicle, so there was no physical contact with that vehicle. They sued, contending
that the physical-contact requirement in their insurance policy was void as against public policy. In
deciding that it was not, we stated, "Because the
Idaho statute neither mandates nor prohibits uninsured motorist coverage in hit-and-run situations,
the physical contact requirement becomes a matter
of contract between the insured and the insurer
which we will not disturb." Id. at 289, 707 P.2d at
400.
We noted, referring to Idaho Code § 41-2502,
that "the uninsured motorist statute itself specifically mentions that automobile insurance policies

must be approved by the director." FNi, We then
stated, "The director's construction of insurance
policies is entitled to great weight and will be followed by this Court absent cogent reasons for holding otherwise." Id
FNl 3. Prior to the 2008 amendment of
Idaho Code § 41-2502, it provided that
motor vehicle liability policies must include uninsured motorist coverage, unless
the insured rejected that coverage. The
statute also stated that the coverage was to
be "under provisions approved by the director of the department of insurance, for
the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death,
resulting therefore." Ch. 61, § I, 1967
Idaho Sess. Laws 124, 125. Except for
adding "and underinsured" before the
words "motor vehicle," that provision remained unchanged when the statute was
amended in 1988 to include underinsured
coverage. Ch. 69, § 1, 2008 Idaho Sess.
Laws 183, 183.
Justice Bistline dissented in Hammon, making
arguments similar to those in the majority opinion
in the instant case. He wrote, "a growing number of
courts, like the Court of Appeals, have found that
physical contact requirements violated the intent of
these statutes [like Idaho Code § 41-2502]." Id. at
290, 707 P.2d at 40 I (emphasis in original). He
contended that this Court should not "dwell[ ] on
the face value of the words of the statute," but
should "probe deeper for a statute's meaning." Id. at
291, 707 P.2d at 402. He argued, "In reviewing the
uninsured motorist coverage statute, to end all analysis at the surface is to frustrate the statute's purpose." Id. Quoting from the Supreme Court of
Hawaii, he called the physical-contact requirement
an "arbitrary barricade erected to eliminate all
claims for damages resulting from one car acci-
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dents"
and
stated
that
such
requirement
"unjustifiably impedes effectuation of the statutory
policy of protection for insureds against damage
from the negligence of unidentified drivers." Id. He
concluded by criticizing the director of the Department of Insurance, stating, "As a final thought, the
Director of the Department of Insurance may be
elated to discover that his apparent approval of the
defendant carrier's policy may be the very factor
which today has thrown the scales of justice out of
balance." Id. at 292, 707 P.2d at 403. Fortunately,
the majority in Hammon was not swayed by Justice
B istline's hyperbole.
In Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987)
, the insureds brought an action to recover under the
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of three different motor vehicle policies issued by State Farm for
three separate vehicles. Because the insureds
claimed that their damages exceeded the policy limit of the UM coverage in the policy covering the
vehicle they were occupying when it was struck by
an uninsured driver, they contended that they were
entitled to stack the uninsured motorist coverages
of all three policies. The policies each had an antistacking clause, but the trial court held that such
clause violated public policy. On appeal, we reversed the trial court.
In doing so, we recognized the authority granted by the legislature to the director of the Department of Insurance to determine whether insurance
policy provisions comport with public policy. We
stated, "The Director *634 **827 of the Department of Insurance is the person entrusted by the legislature to determine whether or not given policies
comport with the public interest. Policies approved
by the Director are thus presumed to be in harmony
with public policy." Id. at 667--68, 735 P.2d at
978-79. We then stated, "In the absence of proof
that a policy contains provisions which conflict
with express legislative directives, the Director's
approval of an insurance policy form is an administrative determination that the policy form is in the

'public interest.' "Id. (emphasis added).
There is no contention that the exhaustion
clause conflicts with any express legislative directives. Indeed, it is the majority opinion that conflicts
with the express legislative directive that it is the
director of the Department of Insurance who is
granted the authority to approve of provisions in
underinsured motorist coverage and to determine if
they are in accordance with public policy. As we
recently stated, "Policies that are approved by the
Director of the Department of Insurance are presumed to be in accordance with public policy. Absent an assertion to the contrary, this Court assumes
the policy was submitted to and approved by the
Director." American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert,
140 Idaho 394, 399, 94 P.3d 699, 704 (2004)
(citations omitted).

3. Judicial decision. Prior to 2008, there were
no statutes in Idaho dealing with UIM coverage. In
Meckert v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 108 Idaho
597, 701 P.2d 217 (I 985), this Court held that there
was no public policy in Idaho regarding UIM coverage. We stated as follows:
[T]he Idaho statutes do not regulate underinsured
motorist coverage. There are no requirements that
insurance carriers offer such underinsured motorist coverage, nor that motorists have such underinsured coverage. Neither the Idaho legislature
nor the courts have declared that there exists a
public policy applicable to underinsured motorist
coverage. While such a policy might be desirable,
that public policy should be enunciated by our legislature and not by this Court.

Id. at 600, 701 P.2d at 220 (italics in original;
citations omitted). We reiterated that holding in Erland v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 136 Idaho 131,
133, 30 P.3d 286, 288 (200 l ), wherein we stated,
"There exists no public policy in regard to underinsured motorist coverage."
The majority contends that public policy has
somehow changed and that "the exhaustion clause
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is void based on Idaho's declared public policy favoring UIM coverage and on the doctrine of judicial economy." Neither of these rationales makes
sense.
The majority does not explain where this alleged doctrine of "favoring UIM coverage" arises,
since the legislature only required that insurance
companies offer such coverage and expressly
provided that insureds can reject it. Does that mean
UIM coverage is more favored than other types of
insurance coverage? Can a court modify to its liking contractual provisions regarding UIM coverage,
but not fire coverage or theft coverage?
This Court has never recognized a "doctrine of
judicial economy," whatever that is. The majority's
list of examples allegedly supporting this doctrine
are totally unsupported by anything in the record,
nor is there anything indicating how often, if at all,
they have occurred in Idaho. We have encouraged
court procedures that promote judicial economy and
have recognized that the doctrine of res judicata is
based, in part, upon judicial economy, but we have
never stricken or modified a contractual provision
on the ground that doing so would promote judicial
economy. If that supposed doctrine trumps contractual provisions, a court presiding over a breach of
contract case should simply declare void the contractual provision(s) allegedly violated in order to
avoid the necessity of further court proceedings and
thereby promote judicial economy. In actuality, in
this case following the law and sustaining the exhaustion clause would promote judicial economy.
The case would be ended.
In an attempt to justify its opinion, the majority
states, "There might be reasons for a claimant to
settle below policy limits that are unrelated to the
amount of damages the claimant has suffered." That
was certainly true in th is case. Plaintiff settled for
$1,000 less than the tortfeasor's policy limits because**828 *635 prior to settling neither the
Plaintiff nor her attorney had ever read her insurance policy, and neither of them knew she had UIM
coverage. During oral argument, the followed ex-

changed occurred:
Justice Warren Jones: Do you say that she didn't
think she had underinsured coverage at the time
she settled?
Mr. Johnson: That's correct, your Honor. She
thought that she just had a bare bones policy and
didn't have underinsured motorist coverage.
Justice Warren Jones: Okay.
Mr. Johnson: She wasn't aware of the exclusion
that I just mentioned on page nineteen of her
policy that states that American Family will pay
under coverage only after the limits of liability
under any policy, liability bonds or policies have
been exhausted by payment or judgments or settlement.
The policy states in bold letters at the top of the
first page, "PLEASE READ YOUR POLICY." Had
either the Plaintiff or her attorney read Plaintiff's
insurance policy, they would have known of the exhaustion clause and undoubtedly would not have
settled with the tortfeasor for $ I ,000 less than the
limits of his liability coverage. Had they refused to
settle for less than the policy limits of $25,000, the
tortfeasor's insurer would undoubtedly have paid
the policy limits rather than incurring thousands of
dollars in legal fees in an attempt to save $1,000.
We have previously stated, "It is certainly not the
law in Idaho that an insured has no obligation to
read his policy .... " Foster v. Johnstone, 107 ldaho
61, 67, 685 P.2d 802, 808 (1984). Apparently, the
public policy underlying the newly created
"doctrine of judicial economy" is that insureds, and
their attorneys, should not be burdened with reading insurance policies and that there should be no
consequences from failing to do so. Judicial economy is apparently also promoted by modifying insurance contracts to avoid malpractice claims
against attorneys who advise their clients to settle
claims against tortfeasors with insufficient liability
insurance coverage before determining whether
their clients have UIM coverage and, if so, the
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policy provisions applicable to such coverage.
In addition, the majority opinion does not
merely apply to claimants who choose to settle for
less than the tortfeasor's policy limits. It would also
apply to cases in which the insured's claim against
the tortfeasor went to trial, and the jury verdict was
for less than the tortfeasor's policy limits. Under the
majority opinion, the insured would be able to still
make a claim under the UIM coverage, hoping to be
more successful the second time.
The majority states, "Exhaustion clauses have
no purpose but to dilute Idahoans' protection
against underinsured drivers and to prevent insureds from collecting legitimate claims." Of
course, there is absolutely nothing in the record
supporting this hyperbole, and it is more indicative
of a belief in a grand conspiracy among evil insurance companies than any understanding as to the
purpose of an exhaustion clause. The majority
faults me for not offering a "legitimate alternative
reason why an insurer would insert such a clause
into its policies." I have not done so because that
was not an issue litigated below, and there is no
evidence in the record regarding it. Although I
could hypothesize a reason, I prefer to make decisions based upon facts in the record rather than
upon wild accusations. There is likewise nothing in
the record to support the majority's claims regarding the difficulties that may be caused by the exhaustion clause, nor is there any evidence as to how
often, if ever, such difficulties have occurred in
Idaho. By asserting that the court can void contractual provisions that may possibly, in some unknown
percentage of cases, increase judicial workloads,
the majority is confused about its proper role. It apparently believes it is also the legislative body in
this state.
There was a time when this Court recognized
its proper role and the limits of its knowledge and
authority. In Blackburn v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co .. I 08 Idaho 85, 697 P.2d 425
( 1985), the plaintiff had obtained a judgment for
$150,000 against the driver of a car that collided

with a vehicle occupied by his wife and three of his
children. She and one child were killed and the other two children were injured. The tortfeasor's liability insurer *636 **829 paid the policy limits of
$20,000, of which the plaintiff received $10,000.
He then brought an action against his own insurance company seeking to recover under his uninsured motorist coverage. He contended that the tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist to the extent that
his liability insurance was insufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his damages. The plaintiff
asked this Court to so hold by following the reasoning of the Arizona and Hawaii Supreme Courts.
We noted "the anomaly [sic] presented by the
circumstances, particularly that a holder of a policy
containing uninsured motorist coverage may well
be in a better position if a tortfeasor carries no insurance whatsoever rather than carrying the minimum coverage mandated by the statute." Id at 90,
697 P.2d at 430. However, we correctly refused to
follow the example of the Arizona and Hawaii
courts because "such clearly would be to indulge in
judicial legislation under the guise of statutory interpretation." Id We understood that such judicial
rewriting of insurance policies could likely result in
an increase of insurance costs to the motoring public. Id We recognized that the plaintiff was, in actuality, asking us to make a policy decision, which
"should rest on factors militating for or against that
decision." Id We held, however, that such policy
decision should be made by the legislature based
upon adequate information. We stated, "However,
all of such questions should be dealt with on the
basis of adequate information (little of which is before this Court) by a legislative body equipped and
authorized to make such policy decisions." Id
In the instant case, the majority has indulged in
judicial legislation under the guise of some illdefined public policy and a newly created doctrine
of judicial economy. The policy decision of whether to prohibit exhaustion clauses should be made by
the legislature, or by the director of the Department
of Insurance, based upon adequate information,
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which the majority lacks. ln Blackburn, this Court
"urge[d] legislative attention to the inequitable results which flow from the language of our statutes."
Id However, in Blackburn, Hammon, and Hansen,
this Court understood its proper role and had the
rectitude to refrain from usurping the authority of
the legislature and the director of the Department of
Insurance. We should follow that example.
Justice HORTON concurs.
Idaho,2011.
Hill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.
150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812
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